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Abstract
There has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the last
decade. PTAs are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus
they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization (MTL). Despite this
important concern with PTAs, there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually
aﬀect MTL. We model the eﬀe c to fP T A so nM T La n ds h o wt h a tP T A ss l o wd o w nM T Lu n l e s s
they have a common external tariﬀ and allow for internal transfers. Next, we use detailed data on
product-level tariﬀs negotiated by the European Union in the last two multilateral trade rounds
to structurally estimate our model. We conﬁrm the main prediction—the European Union’s PTAs
h a v ec l a s h e dw i t hi t sM T L – a n dﬁnd that the eﬀect is quantitatively signiﬁcant. Moreover, we
also conﬁrm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political
economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the European Union.
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In this paper we analyze the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on 
multilateral trade liberalization. First, we develop a model that captures key aspects of the 
current multilateral trading system and different types of  PTAs. Next, we structurally 
estimate the main predictions obtained from our model using product level tariff data for 
the European Union (EU) spanning the Tokyo and Uruguay trade rounds. We show that 
the EU reduced its multilateral tariffs by only about half the amount in the goods 
imported duty-free under a PTA as compared with similar non-PTA goods, hence the 
EU’s PTAs held back its multilateral liberalization. The results are economically 
significant and robust to potential endogeneity problems. If its PTAs had not been present, 
the EU would have reduced its multilateral tariffs on the PTA products by 1.6 percentage 
points more with an average price effect of 50-60%. The EU's multilateral tariff 
reductions were largest for products exported by countries that provided greater increases 
in market access, providing evidence of reciprocity. 
  Our model also incorporates domestic political economy motives for tariff 
determination and we find that tariff levels are inversely related to import penetration and 
import demand elasticity due to the extra weight governments place on producer surplus. 
Furthermore, these industry weights increase in regional concentration and employment 
shares. 
 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over 130 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) were formed in the last ten years—more than in the
previous 50 years combined. Nearly all countries are currently members of at least one PTA and
nearly a third of world trade is carried out under such agreements. Although most economists favor
multilateral trade liberalization (MTL), there is no such consensus on the desirability of preferential
liberalization. The original concern with PTAs was their ambiguous eﬀect on welfare: positive if
the preferential partner is more eﬃcient than the rest of the world but negative otherwise (Viner
[1950]). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, MTL was stalled while the United States and the
European Union pursued PTAs, generating much debate on whether PTAs are a “building block”
or a “stumbling block” toward MTL. (Bhagwati [1991]) This issue is also prominent in the current
multilateral round with several developing countries fearing that MTL by the countries that provide
them with preferential treatment will erode those preferences.1
An important source of concern with PTAs is that they can hurt non-members. One direct channel
by which this occurs is if the PTA members divert their import demand away from the non-members
and that eﬀect is large enough to reduce non-members’ export prices. There is evidence of trade
diversion and also some direct evidence that PTAs do lower export prices for non-members.2 This
and other costs to the non-members due to discrimination disappear if the preference is fully eroded by
MTL. Thus, it is crucial to determine if PTAs hold back MTL and entrench these costs, particularly
given that two-thirds of world trade is not covered by any preferences. After much debate there is
still no theoretical consensus about, and scant empirical evidence of, a “clash of liberalizations”. We
provide evidence of such a clash during the last multilateral trade round by applying product-level
protection data to estimate a model of the interaction of preferential and multilateral liberalization.
Most of the early theory analyzing the eﬀe c to fP T A so nM T La s s u m e dt h a tM T Li m p l i e df r e e
trade. So the research focused on the eﬀect of PTAs on a binary choice between free trade and no
MTL and it eﬀectively asked whether PTAs made a multilateral trade round more or less likely.3
Assuming that a round leads to free trade and focusing on the probability of a round simpliﬁes the
1The latest round was launched in 2001 and, according to a recent article in the leader section of the Economist, a
key factor that may lead to its collapse is that “Poor countries with preferential access to rich world markets want to
make sure that freer trade will not reduce these preferences”. (“Talking the Talk”, July 17th 2004, p.14.) The possibility
that these preferences would reduce MTL is not new: it was a concern raised by opponents of the generalized system of
preferences when it was originally proposed (Johnson [1967] p. 166).
2Romalis (2004) provides evidence of trade diversion for the North American Free Trade Area and its predecessor
between the US and Canada. Chang and Winters (2002) ﬁnd that Mercosur caused lower export prices for non-members.
3Krishna (1998) argues that PTAs reduce the likelihood of a multilateral round because the export rents generated by
PTAs disappear when countries liberalize multilaterally and so the producers that beneﬁt from those rents will oppose
MTL. Levy (1997) shows that the median voter may reject multilateral free trade after voting for a PTA even though
he would have accepted it if no PTA had been available.
1theoretical analysis but makes the predictions nearly impossible to test because multilateral rounds
are so infrequent—eight since GATT was signed in 1947. Moreover, countries can choose to conclude
a multilateral round with either considerable or little liberalization. Thus, the focus should be on
whether PTAs aﬀect the change in multilateral tariﬀs and not simply the probability of concluding
any given multilateral round.4
The model that we develop, which builds on Limão (2002), captures key features of the multilateral
system and of recent PTAs and generates several speciﬁc predictions that we test. The main prediction
is that multilateral tariﬀs are higher on products that a country imports duty-free from preferential
partners than on an otherwise similar good. The basic intuition for this result is the following. Suppose
the European Union (EU) oﬀers duty-free access in a set of products to some North African countries.
The latter beneﬁt from facing a lower tariﬀ than their competitors; the fact that the EU signs the
PTA indicates that its member governments value it at given multilateral tariﬀs. If the EU eliminated
its multilateral tariﬀ on that same set of products, it would eﬀectively eliminate the PTA that it
valued. We show that this additional cost of MTL is only present for the subset of PTA goods and
aﬀects multilateral tariﬀ levels only when the preferential tariﬀ is already zero since otherwise, the
preferential tariﬀ can be reduced to maintain the preferential margin. The model also predicts that
if there is a common external tariﬀ and the ability for direct cash transfers, that is generally present
when there is a common tariﬀ, then no stumbling block eﬀect is present. This occurs because the
EU can now oﬀset any reduction in preferential margins due to MTL through a direct transfer to the
preferential partner.
We estimate the model’s structural equation for the equilibrium trade policy using detailed product
level data for the EU. There are several compelling reasons for focusing on the EU to analyze whether
there is a clash of liberalizations. First, a key concern with PTAs is their potential to harm non-
members. Given that the EU is the world’s largest trader, its trade policy surely aﬀects non-members.
Second, as we discuss below, the EU’s preferential agreements are quite diverse, which allows us to
theoretically derive and test a rich set of predictions. Finally, although the EU accounts for a ﬁfth
of world trade, there is hardly any empirical evidence on the formation of the EU’s trade policy in
general and none that analyzes how its PTAs aﬀect its MTL.5
4Bagwell and Staiger (1998) analyze two opposing eﬀects of PTAs on the equilibrium multilateral tariﬀ level in a
self-enforcing model. They show that PTAs are a stumbling block if countries are very patient and a building block
otherwise. Winters (1999) surveys this literature and Panagariya (2000) the broader issue of regionalism. Another
approach to the PTA vs. MTL issue is due to Krugman (1991) who analyzes the welfare path for exogenously expanding
trading blocs.
5Constantopoulos (1974) and Riedel (1977) examine determinants of industry level protection of individual members
before accession to the EU. Tavares (2001) is an exception in that she analyzes the determinants of the EU’s common
external tariﬀ, also at the industry level. We are not aware of any paper that either estimates the determinants of
2We ﬁnd that the EU’s PTAs generated a stumbling block for MTL in the last trade round. More
speciﬁcally, the EU reduced its multilateral tariﬀs on goods not imported under PTAs by almost
twice as much as on its duty-free PTA goods, as predicted by the model. We ensure that the result
is robust to reverse causation and other possible sources of endogeneity by employing an IV-GMM
estimator and testing for the exogeneity of diﬀerent variables and the validity of their instruments.
The stumbling block eﬀect we estimate is stronger for goods that were exported by all of the EU’s
PTA partners. Moreover, the eﬀect is not present for goods with a positive preferential tariﬀ nor in
agreements with a common external tariﬀ and transfers, which are two auxiliary predictions from our
model. Various sensitivity and speciﬁcation tests provide further support for the baseline estimates.
The results are also economically signiﬁcant. The estimates imply that the average price eﬀect
due to the EU’s multilateral tariﬀ changes was only about half for PTA goods relative to other goods.
Moreover, according to the theoretical model, our estimate represents not only the current wedge in
the tariﬀs between PTA and non-PTA goods but also what the actual tariﬀ wedge for this set of PTA
goods would be relative to the counterfactual where the EU has no preferences for that same set of
goods. That wedge is about 1.5 percentage points whereas the current average tariﬀ for PTA goods
in our sample is 4.7 percent. This evidence along with the stumbling block eﬀect estimated for the
US in Limão (2003) suggest that we should be concerned about a “clash of liberalizations”.6
Reciprocity is a key feature not only of our model but also of the leading economic theory of the
GATT (Bagwell and Staiger [1999]). Although reciprocity is supposed to be an important principle
in multilateral negotiations, some economists question whether it is followed in practice. (Finger,
Reincke, and Castro [1999]). Our estimates indicate that it is: the EU’s tariﬀ reductions were largest
for products exported by countries that provided greater increases in market access.
Finally, we also model and provide novel evidence of the EU’s internal political economy deter-
minants of trade policy. The EU places some, but not much, additional weight on producer than
consumer welfare. In this respect our ﬁndings are similar to structural estimates of the Grossman-
Helpman (1994) model for the US (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi [1999] and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
protection for the EU at the product level or does so structurally.
6It is possible that, in other countries, PTAs lead to lower protection against non-members. Foroutan (1998) ﬁnds
lower average MFN tariﬀs for Latin American countries with PTAs after the Uruguay Round. She agrees that no causality
can be drawn from such a correlation because those countries were moving away from import substitution during the 90’s,
which implied considerable unilateral liberalization independently of any eﬀects from PTAs. This issue of causation is
partially addressed by Bohara, Gawande and Sanguinetti (2004) who estimate that the Argentine unilateral tariﬀsw e r e
lower in industries where the value of imports from Mercosur to value added in Argentina was highest. Neither paper
models MTL in the context of a trade round so, even if we set causation issues aside, there is no systematic evidence
that PTAs lead to more MTL. Even if such evidence is found for Latin American and even some other countries, it will
be diﬃcult to overturn the concern that PTAs slow down MTL because the current evidence supports this conclusion
for two of the largest traders, the EU and the US.
3[2000]). Furthermore we estimate that this extra weight depends positively on an industry’s share of
employment and regional concentration.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by providing background information on the EU’s
trade policy that guides the theoretical and empirical modelling. In section 3 we model the interaction
between PTAs and MTL and derive the main results. In section 4 we ﬁrst discuss the predictions
and our strategy for empirical identiﬁcation and then analyze and quantify the estimation results. In
the ﬁnal section we summarize the main results and discuss their implications. All proofs are in the
appendix.
2 The European Union’s Trade Policy
Until the most recent expansion, the EU’s membership was composed of 15 countries that accounted
for one-third of the world output and more than 20 percent of world trade. The EU succeeded the
European Communities that started in the 1950s as a customs union. Currently the EU members
form a single market with free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor and also cooperation
on foreign and security policy as well as justice and police matters.
The main actors in the formation of EU trade policy are the Commission, the Council, and the
European Parliament. The Commission negotiates and enforces trade policy on behalf of the member
states. The Council, where each member state is represented at the ministerial level, is the decision
maker. It determines a mandate on the basis of a Commission proposal. The Commission negotiates
on the basis of this mandate and the Council must then decide whether to approve the outcome or
not. The European Parliament is regularly informed on trade policy by the Commission but it is also
involved by giving “assent” on major treaty ratiﬁcations that cover more than trade.7
The 1966 Luxembourg Compromise required unanimity in decision-making in the Council for
crucial issues. As a matter of fact, until 1987 the interest groups predominantly concentrated on
lobbying their own governments for protection given this veto power. After the 1987 Single European
Act, the Commission gained greater control and the veto power has been replaced by a qualiﬁed
majority voting and consequently, some interest groups have also started lobbying the Commission
i no r d e rt ob ea b l et oa ﬀect the trade policy determination process, not only the voting outcome.
(Tavares [2001]) However, even after 1987, industry associations continued to favor lobbying their
own government as opposed to the Commission (Hayes [1993]).8 Thus, our assumption in section 4.6
7Based on information from the Directorate General Trade of the European Commission. Accessed on July 30, 2004
at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/index_en.htm>
8There are some exceptions, such as the pan-European organization EUROFER that represents the steel sector but,
4that lobbying works through governments is a reasonable one.
In the appendix, we provide more details about the PTAs the EU participates in (including their
abbreviations)—here we note only a few key points. Several of the EU’s PTAs are non-reciprocal, that
is they do not require the partner to lower their tariﬀs. For example, the GSP, GSPL, and ACP
programs are geared towards developing, and least developed countries and, apart from the stated
objective of trying to incorporate the recipient countries into the world trade economy, they require
cooperation in non-trade issues such as labor standards, human rights, migration control, and combat
against drugs.9 The PTAs with the Mediterranean region countries are also similar in nature and
historically established ties partially aimed at addressing regional externalities such as immigration
problems. These features are captured by our model below. Several of the countries that beneﬁt from
these preferences fear that MTL on the part of the EU will erode the preferences. Thus, they have
at times opposed to MTL but the EU itself has used the same argument to avoid liberalizing, which
i sc e n t r a lt oo u rm o d e l . F o re x a m p l e ,i n2 0 0 0t h eE u r o p e a nC o m m i s s i o na r g u e dt h a tac u ti nt h e
price support of about 25% in EU sugar was not tenable because it would cause an income loss of 250
million Euro to ACP countries, some of whom export sugar to the EU under preferential treatment.10
Six countries acceded to the EU between the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds to the EU, the eﬀects
of which are also modeled and tested in the subsequent sections. Furthermore, in the empirical
estimation, we also consider the bilateral free trade agreements with the remaining EFTA members
that did not join the EU and agreements signed before the UR with some of the Central and East
European transition economies. The imports under the GSP program account for 13 percent of the
total EU imports from the rest of the world. The other shares are 5 percent for EFTX, 2.7 percent for
MED, and 1.4 percent for CEC. GSPL and ACP, on the other hand, account for less than 0.5 percent
of EU’s imports.
3T h e o r y
In this section we derive the structural equations that we estimate and show how PTAs can cause an
increase in the MFN tariﬀs. The model builds on Limão (2002) and extends it along several important
according to Hayes (1993), the strategic decisions are still made by the national governments in the Council even for
steel.
9For instance, Jackson (1997, p.160) notes that “during the last twenty-ﬁve years or so the experience of the GSP in
the GATT system has been that ... the industrialized countries often succumb to the temptation to use the preference
systems as part of ‘bargaining chips’ of diplomacy.” The conditionality of EU’s concessions in exchange for cooperation
has further been documented for instance in Winters (1993) and Grilli (1997).
10European Commission (2000), “Commission proposes overhaul of sugar market,” Brussels, 4 October 2000,
IP/00/1109.
5dimensions. First, we model a political economy motive for the use of tariﬀs ,w h i c hi sa ni m p o r t a n t
determinant of the cross-sectional tariﬀ structure. Second, we allow for a more general trading pattern
and, more importantly, for diﬀerent types of PTAs. The PTAs we consider diﬀer on whether they
involve a common external tariﬀ and allow for direct cash transfers across members. This allows us
to use a single model to nest and test various alternative hypotheses that arise from the various types
of trade agreements signed by the EU.
3.1 Regional Blocs
Each of the two symmetric regional blocs modeled is composed of two economies, Large and Small.
Large has a bigger endowment in the (non-numeraire) traded goods than Small. However, Small must
be important in the non-trade dimension to justify Large seeking its cooperation. Thus we assume
that both countries have the same population to ensure that Large places a non-negligible weight on
those issues proportional to Small’s population, e.g. on human and labor rights or immigration and
environmental issues. We normalize labor units such that each of the H individuals in both countries
is endowed with one unit of labor—the only factor of production. The numeraire good is produced
with labor according to a constant returns to scale production process with marginal product equal
to unity. We normalize the price of the numeraire to one and assume, as is standard, no taxes on it so
that its price is identical in all countries. Some individuals are endowed with a non-numeraire good
indexed by i. For simplicity the ownership of a good i is exclusive and concentrated. That is, each
i n d i v i d u a li se n d o w e dw i t ha na m o u n tXi of at most one good, which nobody else in that economy is
endowed with. Since the remaining features of the large and small economies diﬀer we describe them
separately.
The reference table below describes the notation. Subscript i indexes goods such that i =0for the
numeraire and i ∈ [1,2I] for the non-numeraire goods. The superscript i indexes individuals in Large
that are endowed with i, whereas j indexes the countries: Large, Small, Large* and Small*. Variables
for Large* and Small* are denoted with a “*”.
6Variable deﬁnitions
Xi Large’s endowment of i
Xi/ki Small’s endowment of i, ki ≥ 1
Di Total ﬁxed demand of i in Small
M
j
i Import demand by country j in i
yiL Income of an individual of type i in Large
d(pi) Individual demand for i ∈ [1,2I] in Large
wiL [wS] Indirect utility of individual i in Large [Small]
υ(.) Individual consumer surplus for non-numeraire goods in Large
H Total population in each country
TRj Tariﬀ revenue in j
ωi − 1 Additional weight Large places on import sector surplus
¯ Ψ(EL,ES) Subutility function for the public good in Large
ej Per-capita tax used to ﬁnance public good provision, Ej,i nj
˜ eB [eB] Equilibrium eS under PTAs without [with] a CET
p
j
i Domestic price of i in j = L,L∗
pS
i [pSC
i ] The domestic producer [consumer] price of i in Small
τL
i Large’s speciﬁc preferential tariﬀ on Small’ s exports of i
τB
i Large’s equilibrium speciﬁc preferential tariﬀ
τm
i Large’s speciﬁcM F Nt a r i ﬀ
τCm
i Large’s equilibrium speciﬁcM F Nt a r i ﬀ under no preferential tariﬀ in i
τEXm
i [τEXCUm] Large’s equilibrium speciﬁcM F Nt a r i ﬀ with PTAs without [with] a CET
˜ Gj(.) [Gj(.)] Objective of government j in a PTA without [with] a CET







i )+¯ Ψ(EL,ES) (1)
where cL
0 stands for consumption of the numeraire good and u(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and strictly concave. The subutility function for the public good is deﬁned as
¯ Ψ(EL,ES) ≡ Ψ(EL)+αΨ(ES) α ≥ 0;Ψ  ≥ 0;Ψ   ≤ 0 (2)
There is a regional spillover if α is positive.11 We can interpret E broadly as public expenditures to
address environmental problems, enforce human and labor rights, immigration laws, etc.12
Indexing individuals by the good they are endowed with, we have 2I +1types (where the “extra”
individual type represents those not endowed with any good, just labor). Then, for given prices and
taxes, an individual of type i chooses the quantities of the private goods she consumes to maximize her





i ≤ yiL. Given the assumptions on the subutility,
t h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed with equality and all individuals demand the same quantity of each
11We also assume that Ψ(0) = 0;limE→0 Ψ
 (E)=∞ and limE→∞ Ψ(E) ≤ ¯ ψ. The last boundary assumption ensures
that as long as the population of Small is suﬃciently large, it is not exhausted in producing E, hence the wage is ﬁxed
at unity.
12Limão (2002) shows that the main results extend to the case where the spillovers are global.
7of the non-numeraire goods, d(pi)=u (pi)−1. Thus the indirect utility of an individual of type i is





where the last term represents consumer surplus.13 An individual’s income sources are the wage, the
value of the endowment and net taxes. Net taxes are equal to per capita tariﬀ revenue, TRL/H,n e t
of the per capita tax used to ﬁnance the public good, eL.
The government sets trade policy and supplies the public good in order to maximize a political
support function deﬁned below. The public good is produced using hL
e units of labor according to
EL = bLhL
e .W ea s s u m et h a tt h ep o p u l a t i o ni ss u ﬃciently large so that the numeraire good is always
produced in equilibrium, which ﬁxes the wage at unity—labor’s marginal revenue productivity in the
numeraire sector. Finally, the balanced budget condition implies that the amount of public good
produced in equilibrium is EL = HbLeL.14 Therefore income for individual i ∈ [1,2I] in Large is
yiL =1+pL
i Xi + TRL/H − eL.
Small is endowed with a fraction 1/ki of Large’s total endowment of each good i for a subset
i ∈ [1,s] where s ≤ I. This will also be a subset of the goods imported by Large. We simplify our
model by focusing on a representative agent in Small, hence each individual in Small has a similar
share 1/Hki of Xi.15
In terms of Small’s preferences we assume that it places a lower weight on the public good than
Large and actually focus on the extreme case where individuals in Small place no weight on it.
Second, we assume that up to some price level, ¯ pi, Small demands a total ﬁxed amount Di <X i/ki
and otherwise demands zero. Further, we assume that ¯ pi is very low for i/ ∈ [1,s], the goods that
Small is not endowed with, so in eﬀect this implies that Small has a positive demand for only i ∈ [1,s].
As we will see these assumptions allow us to “model away” trade creation and diversion eﬀects that
would otherwise occur because of a preferential agreement. Although some of these eﬀects certainly
do occur, we want to emphasize a diﬀerent channel by which PTAs aﬀect MTL.16
13Throughout we focus on a quadratic form of the subutility, u =( ac − c
2/2)/b, which gives rise to linear demand
curves and implies that υ =( a − bp)
2 /2b.
14The tariﬀ revenue is distributed lump-sum and we assume that none is used to ﬁnance the public good, which
maintains the two policies within Large separable in the analysis that follows.
15O n ep o s s i b l ej u s t i ﬁcation for employing a representative agent and not modeling a motivation for Small to impose
tariﬀs is that the trade policy of small countries often has a negligible eﬀect on the issue that we address. That is we will
mostly focus on unilateral trade preferences and moreover if a country is truly small, then its policies have no eﬀect on
w o r l dp r i c e sa n dw i l ln o th a v em u c hd i r e c te ﬀect on multilateral liberalization negotiations. Although the EU is planning
to convert some of its unilateral trade preferences outside of the GSP program into reciprocal ones this is in part driven
with compliance issues of the existing schemes in the WTO.
16In the appendix, we show how to extend the model to allow for trade eﬀects and show that this does not aﬀect the
main results. For some of the agreements that we analyze assuming that the changes in trade ﬂows between Large and
8As a result, the indirect utility for an individual in Small is simply the wage income, which is one,
net of taxes, es, plus the value of her endowment and consumer surplus. As will be clear below, we










i Xi/ki +(¯ pi − pSC
i )Di] (4)
3.2 Trade and Price Eﬀects of PTAs
Diﬀerences in the endowments of the large countries determine their trade pattern. We label goods in
increasing order of Large’s endowment—smallest endowment in good 1 and largest in 2I. The “mirror”
symmetry across blocs then implies that the endowment of Large* is biggest for i =1 .T h u s ,L a r g e
imports i ∈ [1,I] from Large* and exports i ∈ [I +1 ,2I]. Since Small has a demand Di <X i/ki for
all prices, it exports i ∈ [1,s].17 The balance of payments condition is satisﬁed through movements of
the numeraire good.
Large sets speciﬁct a r i ﬀso fτL
i and τm
i on the imports from Small and Large* respectively. The
equilibrium domestic price in Large for its set of imported goods, pL








i =0 for i ∈ [1,I] (5)






i for j = L, L∗ and i ∈ [1,I]; MS
i ≡ Di − Xi/ki for
i ∈ [1,s] (recall that MS
i is zero for other products). Because we assume that countries do not use
export subsidies, the domestic price in Large* of a good it exports is simply the price in Large net
of the tariﬀ, pL
i − τm
i .18 A similar condition holds for the goods imported by Large*, i ∈ [I +1 ,2I].
These conditions implicitly deﬁne the domestic prices in the large countries as functions of the tariﬀs—
pL
i (τm
i ) for i ∈ [1,I] and pL∗
i (τm∗
) for i ∈ [I +1 ,2I]. Note that because the net export supplies of
small countries are perfectly inelastic, the equilibrium prices pL
i and pL∗
i are not directly aﬀected by
preferential tariﬀs. It is then simple to show that an increase in τm
i raises pL
i , whereas an increase in
τm∗
i lowers the price for Large’s exporters.19
In the equilibrium without PTAs, small countries do not use tariﬀss i n c et h e yd on o ti m p o r ta n y
Small do not drive Large’s trade policy is not only analytically convenient but also plausible since the additional exports
from a small partner to the EU are unlikely to amount to a large share of the EU’s total imports of that good.
17Symmetrically, Small* exports i ∈ [2I − s,2I].
18Since export subsidies are generally not permitted by the WTO and we have no data, we abstract from them.











9of the non-numeraire goods. Therefore, given that Small has no tariﬀ reductions to oﬀer to Large, a
PTA between Large and Small consists of a tariﬀ reduction by Large on Small’s exports in exchange
for Small’s provision of the regional public good. Even if we modeled a motive for Small to employ
tariﬀs, reductions in those tariﬀs would still be of negligible value to Large given that Small is a price
taker. If Di were zero in Small, then the PTA would not aﬀect the bilateral trade volume of the
non-numeraire goods, but the exporters in Small would receive a higher price and Large would have
to forfeit the tariﬀ revenue. It is also straightforward to show that a PTA does not aﬀect Large’s
total imports in the more general case we have, when small has a positive but ﬁxed demand, Di.
Throughout we assume that there are rules of origin in place, as observed in practice, that prevent
Large* from exporting through Small to Large at the preferential tariﬀ.20
In sum, at given MFN tariﬀs, Large’s total imports remain unchanged, that is there is no trade
creation whether it is a PTA with a common external tariﬀ (CET) or not. There is also no trade
diversion in the traditional sense where a less eﬃcient supplier replaces a more eﬃcient one, because
both Large* and Small are equally eﬃcient. However, with a PTA, Large extracts less tariﬀ revenue on
imports from Small. When transfers are feasible, as it is the case between EU members for example,
we will allow Large to choose whether a direct transfer or a preference is the optimal instrument to
compensate Small for its provision of the regional public good.
3.3 Policy Objectives
We can now write the objective functions for the governments in terms of the policy variables. Denote
Large’s tariﬀ vectors on imports from Large* and Small respectively by τm =( τm
1 ,...,τm
I ) and τL =
(τL
1,...,τL
s ). The only trade taxes set by Large* that aﬀect Large are its tariﬀs, τm∗ =( τm∗
2I ,...,τm∗
I+1),
and, in the absence of export subsidies, we can think of the import sectors in each country as the only
ones potentially “favored” by the governments. Since we also assume that any individual endowed
with a non-numeraire good represents a negligible share of the population, it is reasonable to focus
on a case where those individuals lobby only for policies in their own sector. We can then represent
20In the more general case when Di > 0, the initial exports from Small to Large are Xi/ki −Di before the preference.
The amount of Small’s exports to Large after the preference depends on whether there is a common external tariﬀ
applied by the regional bloc. If there is, then consumers in Small still buy the same amount Di domestically albeit










i ) − τ
m
i . Thus, trade volume in non-numeraire goods within a block remains









i —the price they would receive from selling
in Large. Thus, for a PTA without a CET, Small exports Xi/ki to Large, so its exports increase, but it now imports
Di from Large*. This last eﬀect implies a decrease in exports from Large* to Large that exactly oﬀsets the increase in
exports from Small. So total imports by Large remain unchanged.
10the government in Large as maximizing the following political support function:























If ωi =1for all i, the objective reduces to a standard social welfare function. Therefore ωi−1 represents
the additional weight placed on individuals endowed with an import good. This is a reduced form
that can be obtained as a special case from a model where lobbying is given micro-foundations, an
issue we will explore in an extension of the empirical section. An important issue that arises when
we apply the model to the EU is whether this objective represents individual governments or a joint
objective, as maximized by an EU-wide institution. In the appendix we show that (6) can be obtained
as the objective for the EU that arises from bargaining between independent EU-member governments,
which is a fair representation of the EU’s trade policy formation, as we describe in section 2.21
As previously mentioned, we simplify by not modeling a motivation for Small to employ trade
policy. Therefore, the “political support” function maximized by Small is identical to its total welfare.
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i if there is a PTA with a CET, and pL
i (τm
i ) − τm
i otherwise.







































The ﬁrst expression above applies to a PTA with a CET or when no PTA is present. The second
a p p l i e st oaP T Aw i t h o u taC E T .T h ed i ﬀerence is that in the absence of a CET the consumers in
Small purchase from the lowest cost supplier, Large*, so an amount DS
i that was previously exported
by Large* to Large on which τm was levied is now exported by Small to Large and only τL is collected.
Therefore, at given tariﬀ rates, the objective for Large when it has a PTA with no CET ( ˜ GL)i st h e
21This point will also be important in the empirical section because it will provide us with the correct way for
aggregating the data of the member countries.
11same as with a CET (GL) net of the tariﬀ revenue lost. For Small the opposite is true. That is, given
the constant demand modeled, imposing a CET in an existing PTA simply transfers some income
from Small to Large. In practice such arrangements will have a rule to redistribute such revenues,















3.4 Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization
3.4.1 MFN Tariﬀs without Preferences
We ﬁrst derive the MFN tariﬀ rate that results when PTAs are not allowed. This is the same rate that
results if large countries do not want to pursue a PTA, e.g. if Large did not value the regional public
good. This benchmark tariﬀ plays an important role in the empirical estimation because, as we show,
it is also the equilibrium rate for the subset of products in which Small either does not export or does
not receive any preferences even when PTAs are already pursued. This subset of goods will be our
control group in the estimation. In the next subsection we derive the MFN tariﬀsf o rt h ep r o d u c t s
with preferences.
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999), we model the main motive for reciprocal trade liberalization
in the WTO as overcoming a terms-of-trade externality. Accordingly, most of the negotiations occur
between large countries and follow what is known as the principal supplier rule: if, for a given product,
country A is the largest exporter to B, then B proposes a tariﬀ reduction to A on that product in
exchange for A’s tariﬀ reduction on B’s exports to A. The MFN rule then requires this reduction to
be extended to all other WTO exporters of similar goods.
In the absence of PTAs, the two symmetric large countries choose their multilateral tariﬀst o
maximize their joint objective. Large countries have an individual incentive to cheat and increase their
tariﬀs given their market power in trade. They overcome this problem through repeated interaction
in which case the equilibrium MFN tariﬀ rate is subject to an incentive compatibility constraint,
denoted by ICC, that ensures neither prefers to deviate from the agreement. Given the symmetry
between the two large countries it is suﬃcient to focus on one and, since the problem is stationary,
we can focus on maximizing their objective within each period. Thus, after imposing the symmetry
12condition,τm∗ = τm, the equilibrium multilateral tariﬀsi nt h ea b s e n c eo faP T Aa r eg i v e nb y
τCm ≡ argmax
τ m {GL(τL,e S =0 ,τm,τm∗ = τm,.):τL = τm;ICC} (10)
where the constraints require no preferential tariﬀs, τL = τm, and incentive compatibility. For
simplicity we abstract from potential enforcement problems between large countries in setting their
multilateral tariﬀs by assuming they are suﬃciently patient such that the incentive compatibility
constraints for MTL do not bind.22 Given the additive separability of the eﬀect of diﬀerent goods
on the objective and the symmetry across large countries, the tariﬀ for good i is independent of
Large’s MFN tariﬀs in other goods. Therefore, the expression for the MFN tariﬀ below—derived in
the appendix—applies to any good that is not subject to a preference, i.e. whenever τm
i = τL
i ,a n d
whether PTAs are allowed or not.23 We derive the advalorem equivalent because that is the focus




which, according to the FOC for the program above, gives us
tCm













The import demand elasticity of Large is denoted by ε whereas the foreign export supply elasticity
it faces is ε∗.24 If good i is not exported by the regional partner, i.e. if MS
i =0 , this expression is
similar to several political economy models. (Helpman [1997]) If in addition there is no extra weight
on the import competing sector the tariﬀ is zero. Otherwise the tariﬀ is increasing on that weight
and the value of the endowment relative to imports and decreasing in import demand elasticity for
standard Ramsey taxation reasons. The last term represents an MFN externality eﬀect and leads to
higher tariﬀs. It arises because the MFN clause requires Large to lower the tariﬀ on imports from all
partners even if some do not reciprocally lower their own tariﬀs, as is the case for Small. The MFN
externality disappears either if Large has no market power in good i, 1/ε∗
i =0 , or if Small’s share in
Large’s total imports is negligible, as we assume in the model.
22For a detailed analysis of the issues that arise when these constraints do bind, see Limão (2002).
23Symmetry across countries allows us to focus on reciprocity across pairs of symmetric goods. In general, reciprocity
occurs across sets of goods, which we will take into account in the estimation.








133.4.2 MFN Tariﬀs with Preferences
We ﬁrst model how the preferential tariﬀ is chosen to then determine its eﬀect on MFN tariﬀs. Large
makes a take-it-or-leave-it (TOL) oﬀer to Small that involves a reduction in the preferential tariﬀ,
τL,b e l o wτm in exchange for an increase in Small’s provision of the regional public good. In a one-
shot interaction both countries have an incentive to cheat but cooperation can be sustained through
repeated interaction. This implies that Large’s TOL oﬀer must ensure that Small does not have an
incentive to deviate from the agreement and stop supplying the public good. Since we allow Large to
make a TOL oﬀer, it will always extract as much of the bargaining surplus as possible so that Small’s
incentive compatibility constraint is just binding.
The incentive compatible level of eS is obtained by requiring the current gain to Small from
deviating, i.e. setting eS =0 , not to exceed the foregone gains from cooperation due to the PTA. The
equilibrium condition for eS under a PTA with no CET is as follows.25
˜ GS(τL,e S =0 ,τm) − ˜ GS(τL,e S,τm) ≤
δ
1 − δ
[ ˜ GS(τL,e S,τm) − ˜ GS(τT,e S =0 ,τm)] (12)
where δ ∈ (0,1) represents Small’s discount factor and τT stands for the threat level of the tariﬀ used
by Large if Small stops cooperating. When Small is a WTO member the highest credible threat tariﬀ
that Large can use is to revert to the MFN tariﬀ, τm, as required by WTO rules.26 Then, using the
deﬁnition of ˜ GS in (9), we obtain the equilibrium TOL bargaining solution level of eS for a given
preferential margin, τm − τL. Assuming for simplicity that Small exports only good 1 we have
˜ eB = δ(τm
1 − τL
1)X1/Hk1 (13)
Therefore the amount of tax that Small will collect to supply the regional public good is proportional
to the revenue transfer from Large due to the preferential treatment. Given the additive separability
o ft h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o nt h eM F Nt a r i ﬀsf o rg o o d so t h e rt h a ns =1are given by (11). The MFN
constraint is now relaxed, τL ≤ τm, and the preferential tariﬀ is optimally chosen taking into account
t h ef a c tt h a ti tw i l la ﬀect ˜ eB.W ec o n t i n u et oa s s u m et h a tl a r g ec o u n t r i e sa r es u ﬃciently patient such
25We assume that the MFN tariﬀs are set on the assumption that the small countries accept a PTA and will not
deviate. Moreover, if Small does deviate, Large removes the preference given to Small and sets its tariﬀ equal to the
MFN tariﬀ originally agreed upon with Large*. That is we assume that after a deviation by the small country in the
supply of the public good, the large countries do not renegotiate their MFN tariﬀs. An alternative is to assume that
after a deviation by Small the MFN tariﬀ implemented is changed to τ
Cm. This introduces some changes but similar
qualitative results can be obtained regarding the stumbling block eﬀect. In practice, we think our assumption is more
realistic since there are costs to re-adjusting MFN tariﬀs between rounds which may lead governments not to do so.
26The case where Large’s incentive compatibility constraint for the PTA also binds is analyzed in Limão (2002).
14that their IC, now denoted as ICEX, do not bind. Substituting in the equilibrium value of eS just
derived, the equilibrium MFN and preferential tariﬀs are given by
{τEXm,τB} ≡ arg max
τ m,τ L{ ˜ GL(τL,e S,τm,τm∗ = τm,.):τL ≤ τm;ICEX;eS =˜ eB} (14)
From this we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium (advalorem) MFN tariﬀ rate.27
tEXm




















In order to compare the MFN tariﬀ for a given good when PTAs are allowed against the tariﬀ
that would emerge if they were forbidden, we can evaluate the right-hand side of (15) using the tariﬀ
level that emerges in the absence of PTAs, tCm
i . When we do so, we obtain a non-negative term that
captures the potential for a stumbling block eﬀect of a PTA:
tEXm
i − tCm








i ≥ 0 (16)
To interpret and sign this term note ﬁrst that 1/Mip L
i εi > 0. So the sign depends on the remainder
of the expression, (δ ˜ GL





= δXi/Hki and from (8) we
have ˜ GL
τL = Xi/ki.Therefore, (δ ˜ GL
eS/H − 1)Xi/ki = −( ˜ GL
τL + ˜ GL
eS
∂eB
∂τL). The last expression is simply
what arises from the ﬁrst order condition for τL, which is positive if the optimal preferential tariﬀ
rate is zero at τCm
i .T h a ti st os a y ,i fw ea r ea tac o r n e rs o l u t i o ni nt h eP T A ,w h e r eL a r g ew o u l dl i k e
an increase in the supply of eS but cannot lower its preferential tariﬀ because it is already at zero.
In this case there is an incentive to increase the MFN tariﬀ above τCm
i .As u ﬃcient condition for a
corner solution in the PTA is for α, the scope of the spillover to be suﬃciently large.
The intuition for the stumbling block eﬀect is straightforward. When the marginal beneﬁtt o
Large from additional supply of the regional public good is higher than the cost in terms of foregone
tariﬀ revenue, Large would prefer to increase the preferential margin given to Small and it initially
does this by reducing the preferential tariﬀ. However, once the preferential tariﬀ is at zero, then the
preferential margin can only be increased by raising the MFN tariﬀ.
27See the appendix for the derivation.
153.4.3 Common External Tariﬀ a n dC a s hf o rC o o p e r a t i o n
T h e r ei sal o n gl i t e r a t u r eo nv a r i o u sa s p e c t so fP T A st h a ts h o w st h a tt h e i re ﬀects often depend on
the existence of a CET.28 Given that between the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds—the period we analyze
in the empirical work—the EU expanded to include new members that share its CET, we analyze the
eﬀe c to fs u c ha c c e s s i o n so nM T L .
T h eu s eo faC E Tr a i s e st h ep r a c t i c a li s s u eo fh o wt h et a r i ﬀ r e v e n u ei st ob ed i s t r i b u t e do v e rt h e
diﬀerent countries. If all goods enter the EU via one port, does that country receive all the revenue?
In order to address this issue, PTAs with a CET specify revenue transfer mechanisms. Therefore,
one key diﬀerence relative to other PTAs is the existence of a mechanism for transfers, which Large
can use to provide an incentive for Small to supply the regional good. In the context of the EU
such transfers go well beyond tariﬀ revenue distribution and therefore we now model the eﬀect of a
CET in the presence of transfers and show that such transfers will either partially or fully replace the
manipulation of MFN tariﬀs to obtain cooperation from regional partners.
The possibility of transfers also raises the question of whether preferences in this model would
b eg i v e ni nt h eﬁr s tp l a c e ,s i n c et h em o t i v ef o rL a r g ei nu s i n gt h e mi st oo b t a i neS.B e l o ww es h o w
the conditions under which Large will optimally use both transfers and preferences. This will show
that the model can explain preferential treatment even if Large can also use cash to obtain Small’s
cooperation.
If Small can deviate in the provision of the public good then its incentive compatibility constraint
is still (12). If we allow a transfer T from Large to Small when cooperation starts then we have:
[GS(τL,e S =0 ,τm)+T] − [GS(τL,e S,τm)+T] ≤
δ
1 − δ
[GS(τL,e S,τm)+T − GS(τT,e S =0 ,τm)]
where the left-hand-side represents Small’s gain from deviating and the right-hand-side the discounted
value from cooperating. Using the deﬁnition of GS in (7), we obtain the equilibrium level of eS for a
28Cadot et al. (1999) argue that “deepening integration is likely to work toward reinforcing protectionist pressures
against nonmembers” when there is a CET but not necessarily if the PTA has no CET in place. Bagwell and Staiger
(1998) indicate that in the absence of a CET PTAs would undermine reciprocity and non-discrimination, the main pillars
of the multilateral trading system. However, they also show that PTAs with a CET could still be eﬃcient in terms of
reciprocity as long as external tariﬀs are in line with the non-discrimination principle.
16given preference, τm
1 − τL
1,a n dt r a n s f e r ,T,a s 29
eB = δ(T +( τm
1 − τL
1)(X1/k1 − D1))/H (17)
Now the extent of Small’s regional good supply depends on the transfer and the additional revenue
from the preferential margin on its exports, X1/k1 − D1.
The large countries maximize their joint objective net of any transfers made to the regional partner.
By allowing them to optimally choose the instruments we can answer whether a PTA with a CET
will take place and how it aﬀects MFN tariﬀs.
{τEXCUm,τB,TB} ≡ arg max
τ m,τ L,T
{GL(τL,e S,τm,τm∗ = τm,.)−T : τL ≤ τm;ICCU;eS = eB} (18)
As we show in the appendix solving this problem yields the following relationship between the equilib-
rium preferential tariﬀ, τB, the MFN tariﬀ with a CET, τEXCUm, and the MFN tariﬀ in the absence
of preferences, τCm.
τEXCUm = τCm ; τB ≤ τEXCUm (19)
The stumbling block eﬀect is no longer present under a CET with transfers but, despite the extra
ability to use transfers, a preferential rate may still utilized. Both transfers and preferential tariﬀ
reductions may be used because Large is indiﬀerent between the two. At a given MFN tariﬀ,t h ec o s t
of a reduction in τL is simply the lost tariﬀ revenue for Large and since Small’s exports are inelastic
this lost revenue is no more costly than simply transferring an equivalent amount in cash/numeraire
good. Therefore, a preference may be provided, i.e. τB ≤ τEXCUm. The diﬀerence relative to the
PTA without a CET is that now, if at τL =0Small is still not providing “enough” of the public good,
the optimal solution is to increase the transfer rather than the MFN tariﬀ. This occurs because a
higher MFN tariﬀ is more costly than higher transfers for Large, because it distorts the prices. Since
Large is indiﬀerent between using τL and transfers for all levels of transfers and τL, it prefers to use
T instead of increasing the MFN tariﬀ. So in equilibrium we have τEXCUm = τCm.
29An alternative case would be to allow Small to simultaneously deviate in its supply of the public good and allow its
consumers to import from the rest of the world at a lower price, which would generate an additional motive to deviate.
W ec a nt h e ns h o wt h a te




1 )(δX1/k1 −D1))/H. The additional incentive to deviate only arises if Small
is given a trade preference. This implies that a direct transfer has an added advantage over the preference if we assumed
that Small would deviate in this way.
174 Estimation
4.1 Predictions and Identiﬁcation
We now derive the main estimating equation, discuss its main predictions and analyze how it is
identiﬁed. Combining the expression for the MFN tariﬀ rate in a good without preferences,(11), and
the one with preferences, (15), we obtain the following.




















where Ii is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the good is imported from a preferential partner and











respectively and dropping the product subscript we have the following econometric model.
t = φI + βx + m + u (21)





ε|x,m,I) and β = E((ωi − 1)|x,m,I). Note that




ε|x,m,I) > 0 and therefore the
coeﬃcient φ is positive if and only if δ ˜ GL
eS/H > 1, which we showed is the condition for a stumbling
block eﬀect to exist. Therefore, from an econometric perspective the key prediction we test is whether
φ is positive or not. There are also two auxiliary predictions that arise immediately from the theory
and that we test. First, φ =0for products with a positive preferential tariﬀ. Second, the MFN tariﬀ
on products exported by countries that recently entered the EU and have access to transfers should
be no diﬀerent than the one for non-PTA goods.
The theoretical model captures key features of trade policy determination. However, it is a parsi-
monious model which might not be fully speciﬁed. One important concern is that since tariﬀst e n d
to be highly persistent, there may be an unobserved component determining the tariﬀ level for each
product. Such an eﬀect may also inﬂuence whether a good receives a preference and thus potentially
generate an omitted variable bias. We address this issue by estimating the model in changes rather
than levels.30 Since the model focuses on MFN tariﬀs, most of which the EU changes infrequently, we
take the change as the diﬀerence between the MFN tariﬀs negotiated in the UR and those in place
30Considering changes over two multilateral rounds in the empirical work is not inconsistent with the theoretical model.
Even though the theoretical model features no expected changes in protection after MTL occurs and PTAs are agreed,
it does allow for unexpected changes. That is if in a period the production to import ratio or political weights fall,
then the equilibrium MFN tariﬀ also falls according to the model. Moreover, once we allow the incentive compatibility
constraints of the large countries to play a role in constraining the level of multilateral liberalization then shocks to their
discount factors would also change the equilibrium level of MFN tariﬀs.
18before it, which were largely set during the Tokyo Round. Then, the change for a good i that was
not imported under a zero preferential tariﬀ before the Tokyo Round but became so by the time the
Uruguay Round was negotiated is
∆t = φI + β∆x + ∆m + v (22)
where E(v|∆x,∆m,I)=0 ,a n dβ and φ have the same interpretations as in the cross-section equation.
Note that we assumed that the weights, ωi, are time-invariant, an assumption that we will test. More
importantly, we used the fact that for a good i that was not imported under a zero preferential tariﬀ
before the Tokyo Round we have Iit−1 =0and if it became a “PTA” good before the conclusion of
the UR then Iit =1 .31
One important determinant that is not explicitly reﬂected in (22) is reciprocity—the extent to
which a country lowers its tariﬀs in response to another country’s tariﬀ reductions. Reciprocity is an
important principle in WTO negotiations and also a basic feature of our theoretical model but it is
not fully reﬂected in the expression above because we assumed that the large countries are symmetric
and then solved for the equilibrium tariﬀ. We should point out that an element of reciprocity, or
rather lack thereof, is reﬂected through the MFN externality term, m. Recall that this term captures
how much higher the MFN tariﬀ is because of those small exporters that do not participate in the
negotiations, i.e. do not oﬀer reciprocal tariﬀ reductions but receive the MFN tariﬀ.32
To relax the symmetry in the model and capture reciprocity in the estimation we follow Limão
(2003) who constructs a measure of market access “concessions” that is consistent with how multilat-











jt is the percentage tariﬀ reduction by country c in good j and wc
jt is the import share
of good j in total imports of c. Therefore the term in brackets captures country c’s average market
access concession, which is multiplied by sc
it—the export share of a principal supplier c to the EU as
a share of total exports from all of the EU’s principal suppliers. The prediction is that in the goods
exported by countries that oﬀered relatively larger concessions, the EU will reciprocate by oﬀering
31To conﬁrm that the underlying parameters in the change equation can be interpreted exactly as the ones in the
















(ωi − 1)∆xi + ∆mi. Thus, for PTA goods from agreements that were in place before the Tokyo Round, e.g. for certain
G S Pa n dA C Pg o o d s ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on Ii measures any increase in the marginal beneﬁtt ot h eE Uf r o mt h ep r o v i s i o n
of the regional public good between the two rounds.
32In the context of our model, only the small countries entering into the PTAs were assumed not to liberalize recipro-
cally. However, in practice there are several small countries that have not pursued signiﬁcant reciprocal tariﬀ reductions.
If there was a signiﬁcant change in m between the two rounds, this would imply that some countries in the last round
oﬀered more reciprocal tariﬀ reductions.
19relatively larger MFN tariﬀ reductions of its own. As we discuss below, including reciprocity in the
estimation will also help us to address a data problem with the MFN externality eﬀect.
Augmenting (22) to explicitly account for reciprocity the basic estimating equation becomes the
following.
∆t = φI + β∆x + ρR + ∆m + v (23)
There are no data available to construct the exact MFN externality variable. The main reason
for this is that we do not have a bilateral record of which countries did not negotiate with the EU on
speciﬁc products during the trade rounds. Therefore, in our basic estimation we do not include this
variable. This raises the issue of omitted variable bias unless E(∆m|∆x,I,R)=0 , but we believe it is
mitigated for two reasons. First, reciprocity will act partially as a proxy for the missing variable, since
those countries that free-ride will have small average tariﬀ reductions and the EU will “reciprocate”
with smaller tariﬀ reductions of its own. Second, we employ an instrumental variables approach based
on a GMM estimator that allows us to test the orthogonality of our instruments to the error term. If
the omitted variable bias is a serious problem, then the orthogonality tests should fail. Moreover, in
the robustness section 4.5 we construct a proxy for the MFN externality eﬀect and ﬁnd that it does
not aﬀect the results.
There are other potential endogeneity problems that we address in estimating (23). First, whether
a particular product receives a preference is likely to depend on some unobserved characteristics that
are product-speciﬁc. This is addressed by estimating in diﬀerences. Second, the preference may
depend on MFN tariﬀ changes, e.g. if a PTA partner expects a small MFN reduction in a product,
it may be more likely to request a preference in it then in a product where it expects a large MFN
reduction. In order to address this potential problem we ﬁrst make sure that the PTAs considered take
eﬀect before the multilateral tariﬀ changes are implemented for the UR. However, this does not solve
the problem if the tariﬀ change was correctly anticipated. To tackle reverse causation, and also the
potential bias from omitting the exact MFN externality variable we employ instrumental variables.
T h em a i ni n s t r u m e n tf o rt h eP T A - g o o dv a r i a b l e ,I, is an indicator variable which is equal to one
when a product is imported by the EU from the PTA partner in 1994 regardless of whether it receives
a preference or not. The instrument is correlated with Ii, that is whether a product both receives
a preference and is imported from the preferential partner but we expect it to be uncorrelated with
the error term since the changes in the MFN tariﬀ we use as a dependent variable are implemented
starting only in 1995. The second main instrument for Ii is whether the good was subject to an NTB
set by the EU in 1993 on all countries. A country is more likely to seek a preference in a good if
20it expects that otherwise it would certainly be subject to an NTB. This eﬀect would be magniﬁed if
the country already exports this product, hence we interact this variable with the export indicator as
well. Moreover, the decision to export a good prior to the UR may be independent of the subsequent
MFN tariﬀ changes so that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. Nonetheless, we will
be able to test and verify the exogeneity of the export indicator and NTBs as instruments because we
employ a GMM approach. The set of overidentifying restrictions that allow us to perform these tests
arise from including other instruments such as world price changes between 1992 and 1994 which can
h e l pt op r e d i c ti fag o o dw a se x p o r t e di n1 9 9 4b u ta r eu n l i k e l yt od e p e n do nt h ec h a n g e si nM F N
tariﬀs that take place in subsequent years.
The variable that captures the political economy eﬀect, ∆x, is likely to depend on the MFN tariﬀs
since it involves the production/import ratio weighted by the import demand elasticity, all of which
are functions of the EU’s domestic prices and hence its MFN tariﬀs. Therefore, we employ the levels
of these variables before the MFN tariﬀ is implemented, e.g. 1978 for xt−1 and 1992 for xt.W e
ﬁnd some evidence of endogeneity and therefore instrument ∆x with a measure of scale economies
(Value added/number of ﬁrms) and its interaction with the average world price change in the industry
between 1992 and 1994. We also test this set of instruments to ensure that they are orthogonal to the
error.
Finally, the reciprocity term also poses a potential endogeneity problem in the form of reverse
causation since the total tariﬀ reduction by other WTO members in the UR will partially depend
on the EU’s reductions. We instrument reciprocity by using the unilateral portion of the total tariﬀ
reductions that are eventually oﬀered at the UR. More speciﬁcally, the reductions between 1986 and
1992 were unilateral because they were undertaken by various countries, outside of GATT negotiations,
which did not know if these reductions would be reciprocated at all. In fact it was not clear at the time
if the round would even be completed. However, when the ﬁnal cuts were negotiated, between 1992
and 1994, the unilateral reductions undertaken from 1986 to 1992 were explicitly reciprocated because
they had taken place after the oﬃcial start date of the round (Finger et al. [1999]). Therefore, the
unilateral liberalization by the other WTO members (between 1986 and 1992) is used as an instrument
for their total liberalization (between 1986 and 1995).33
4.2 Data
In the appendix section A.5 we provide detailed deﬁnitions and sources for each of the variables; their
summary statistics are presented in table 7. Here we point out some salient characteristics of the
33Limão (2003) provides a detailed argument for the use of this instrument for reciprocity.
21data. The advalorem tariﬀ rates for the EU before and after the Uruguay Round (UR) are available
through the WTO schedules of concessions at the 8-digit HS level and the 8-digit preferential tariﬀ
rates are obtained from UNCTAD.34 The intra and extra-EU bilateral trade data is available at the
same level of disaggregation through Eurostat. In order to construct the reciprocity variable for a
given country we employ the data in Finger et al. (1999) who use the available tariﬀ reductions for
each WTO member for each product during the UR aggregated by country into averages and then
weighted by own imports. They calculate both the tariﬀ reductions from 1986-95 and 1992-95, which
tend to diﬀer mainly for the countries that undertook considerable unilateral liberalization between
1986-92. This is an important point in identifying the reciprocity eﬀect as we describe above. From
these we construct our own product weighted measures of reciprocity that account for the share of
each main exporter to the EU in a particular good.
We also require data on production and other industry variables that we use as instruments for
x. This data is typically available for EU members and we aggregate it in the way that is suggested
by the theoretical model.35 UNIDO’s industrial database provides the most comprehensive source
covering all EU members and dating back to 1978. UNIDO’s data is collected at the industry level
and hence it is more aggregated than the trade and tariﬀ data, which could potentially introduce
some measurement error. Although we can not rule out this possibility, we note that it may not
be such an important concern for the following reason. If the EU negotiators use the data at the
most disaggregated level available for most of its members, as we do, then our measure is actually the
relevant one.36 Furthermore, we argue that our use of instrumental variables reduces any measurement
error problem generated by using industry data for this variable.
Using industry level data for x does imply that the interpretation of β is now as the average
EU-wide extra weight taken over the diﬀerent industries rather than products. We are comfortable
with this interpretation, since producers tend to organize at the industry level to lobby for protection.
This is particularly true in the EU, where there is more variation in protection across industries than
within them. Therefore, to the extent that the extra weight reﬂects a political economy motive, the
34We exclude products with a zero MFN tariﬀ before the Uruguay Round for two reasons. First, when the MFN tariﬀ
is zero there is often more noise in the data about whether a preference exists or not, since it is in eﬀect irrelevant.
Second, all the tariﬀs in the sample that were initially zero remained unchanged and are likely to share an unobserved
common characteristic. Thus, including those observations would bias the estimates if the proportion of zero tariﬀsi s
diﬀerent for PTA goods relative to the rest of the goods.
35In terms of production this entails simply adding it up over the EU members. The interpretation of the political








i is the individual member weight for a given
producer and ξ
c
i is the production share in the EU as shown in section A.1 of the appendix.
36In calculating the variable (XI/MI)/εI the remaining variables that we employ are at the same level of aggregation
as the production data. Moreover, the import demand elasticity we calculate is for the EU as a whole, as required by
the model. For this we use the structural estimates of the parameter ann for each 3-digit product from Kee, Nicita and
Olarreaga (2004) along with the EU’s imports to GDP ratio in that industry.
22best way to identify it is at the industry level.37
T a b l e1p r e s e n t st h et a r i ﬀ levels and their changes for our sample. Although our analysis is con-
d u c t e da tt h ep r o d u c tl e v e lw ep r o v i d es o m es t a t i s t i c sh e r ea g g r e g a t e db yi n d u s t r y .T h eh i g h e s tt a r i ﬀ
rates before and after the UR appear in the tobacco sector (SIC-314): an average of 42 and 25 percent
respectively. The lowest pre-UR tariﬀs are in the miscellaneous petroleum and coal products sector
(SIC-354) with 3.9%, whereas the iron and steel industry (SIC-371) became the least protected in
terms of tariﬀs after the UR, 0.4%. The footwear sector (SIC-324) experienced the least liberaliza-
tion, 0.8 percentage points, and tobacco the highest, 17. Note also that there is a considerable amount
o fv a r i a t i o ni nt a r i ﬀ changes both within industries, with coeﬃcients of variation between 0.28 and
1.5, and across industries, with a coeﬃcient of variation of 0.44.
4.3 Estimation Results
The unconditional mean reduction in MFN tariﬀsb yt h eE Uw a s4 . 4p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t sf o rn o n - P T A
products but only 2.9 for PTA products during the UR. A simple t-test conﬁrms that the diﬀerence
of 1.5 percentage points, with a standard error of 0.1, is statistically signiﬁcant. This diﬀerence
may be due to other factors that are correlated with the PTA variable. Therefore in table 2 we
present the estimates of the parameters in (23). In order to address the endogeneity issues discussed
above we employ an instrumental variables technique. More speciﬁc a l l y ,w eu s et h et w o - s t e pe ﬃcient
generalized method of moments estimator, which is robust to heteroskedasticity with an undetermined
form. Furthermore, we allow for the errors to be correlated through clustering within each industry for
which the production data is used to ensure the estimation is also robust to arbitrary within-industry
correlation.38
The variable Iany0 in table 2 takes the value one for goods imported at a duty-free preferential rate
37The share of between-industry variation relative to total variation in the MFN tariﬀ r a t e sf o rE Ui st w i c ea sh i g ha s
in the US for instance. This is the case both in levels (0.62-0.69) and in changes (0.34). This might be partly due to the
fact that the original CET in 1968 was an average of the tariﬀs of the founding members. When the averaging is done for
each product across countries, the within variation for any given industry falls relative to what it was for any individual
country. Thus, the share of the variation between industries after the averaging tends to increase relative to what it
was for any given country. Moreover, from a political economy perspective, it is easier to build consensus for tariﬀsa t
the industry level (most countries are likely to produce some product in any given industry) rather than at the product
level (some countries do not produce some products and would clearly loose when the CET on it is raised). In eﬀect, the
consumers are relatively organized in a CU because each government is likely to represent them when the country is a net
importer. Producers from diﬀerent countries that join for EU-wide lobbying on trade policy are more likely to maintain
their coalition together if they focus on a level of protection that is similar for all of them, that is a level of protection
with little within industry variation. A similar eﬀect arises when ministers from diﬀerent countries representing a given
sector, say agriculture, must agree on an EU-wide policy. Each demand protection for some products and will support
protection favored by other countries in other products, if they expect this to increase the probability of protection for
their own products of concern, which Winters (1994) describes as the “restaurant bill” eﬀect.
38In section 4.5 we discuss formal tests of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity that justify this procedure and compare
the results to those obtained using OLS.
23by the EU from any of its preferential partners and is zero otherwise.39 The variable excludes countries
that share a CET with the EU and have acceded after the Tokyo Round: Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Austria, Finland and Sweden. We estimate that eﬀect separately as suggested by our theoretical
m o d e l .T h ee s t i m a t e so ft h ec o e ﬃcient for Iany0 are positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level under all
speciﬁcations, which provides evidence that there was a smaller reduction in the EU’s MFN tariﬀsf o r
its PTA products (with a zero preferential tariﬀ) relative to its non-PTA products as predicted by the
model. Before quantifying the importance of this stumbling block eﬀect, we test other predictions of
the model.
The model also predicts that the stumbling block eﬀect is only present for products with a zero
preferential tariﬀ rate. We test this in column 3 where the variable Iany takes the value of one for
goods imported by the EU at a preferential tariﬀ rate—either zero or positive—whereas Ipos is one
for the subset of goods with a positive preferential tariﬀ, which account for only about 1.5 % of the
observations in the sample. The total eﬀect of a good with a positive preferential tariﬀ is obtained
b ys u m m i n gt h et w oc o e ﬃcients and we can’t reject the hypothesis that the tariﬀ reduction for such
goods is the same as that of non-pta products, as predicted.
According to the model MFN tariﬀ changes for products imported from countries that joined the
EU between the last two trade rounds should be identical to those of other products if transfers are
oﬀered as part of the accession to the EU, which we conﬁrm to be true in column 4. The variables Iafs
and Ispg are indicator variables for products exported by Austria, Finland and Sweden and Spain,
Portugal and Greece respectively, which are statistically insigniﬁcant. The stumbling block eﬀect
generated by the PTAs that do not share a common external tariﬀ with the EU remains unchanged
both in magnitude and signiﬁcance.
The model also predicts that the stumbling block eﬀect should be stronger in products that are
important exports for a PTA partner, as we can see from the fact that in (20) the stumbling block
eﬀect is multiplied by the level of exports by the PTA partner, Xit/kit. We test this by introducing
an additional variable, Ihiexp—the interaction of Iany0 with Dhiexp, where Dhiexp is one if the share of
a PTA partner’s exports in good i relative to its total exports to the EU is above a certain threshold.
I nc o l u m n5w ee s t i m a t et h a ts u c ha ne x t r ae ﬀect is present.40
39The ﬁner the level of disagregation the bigger the potential for product misclassiﬁcation when a shipment is recorded.
We employ data at the 8-digit so we try to minimize this problem by reclassifying a good as being exported by a PTA
to the EU only if the value registered in that year is above a certain low threshold. The results in table 2 employ the
5th percentile as the threshold for a product deﬁned with respect to the total exports from that PTA to the EU. We
test whether this aﬀects our results in section 4.5.
40Table 2 presents the case where the threshold is set at the twenty-ﬁfth percentile but the results are qualitatively
similar if diﬀerent levels such as the median or 75th percentile are used.
24If a product is exported by several preferential partners, then a given increase in the margin of
preference beneﬁts more than one of these partners. In order to test whether this creates an increased
incentive for the EU to hold back MFN tariﬀs, we include an additional variable in column 2 of table
2, Ievy0, which is one if the product is imported by the EU at a preferential duty-free rate from all
of its preferential partners, and zero otherwise. We estimate that the stumbling block eﬀect for this
subset of products is indeed larger.
The EU has several diﬀerent preferential programs. The estimates we have presented thus far refer
to an average eﬀect of all these programs. This average eﬀect is arguably closer to the theory since the
model we provided focuses on a single PTA. However, it may be useful to quantify whether the eﬀect
is being driven by any given PTA in particular. Moreover, such estimates are an important input
for determining the welfare eﬀects of eliminating speciﬁc PTAs, as Limão and Olarreaga (2004) do
for example. Although there is a positive correlation among the variables for the diﬀerent programs
we do identify a stumbling block eﬀect originating from each in column 6. All individual eﬀects are
signiﬁcant with the exception of the one for the ACP, which is nonetheless signiﬁcant when tested
jointly with the GSP, a program that is highly correlated with it.
As we point out in the introduction reciprocity is a key variable in the theory behind MTL but
there is some disagreement about its use in practice. We ﬁnd that the EU reduced its tariﬀs by more
in products exported by trading partners that reduced their own tariﬀs by a greater amount. Note
that, reciprocity may magnify the stumbling block eﬀect, since smaller reductions in the EU will be
reciprocated by smaller reductions in the trading partners. Since Limão (2003) also ﬁnds reciprocity to
be a signiﬁcant factor in the US multilateral tariﬀ reductions in the UR we expect that the stumbling
block eﬀe c to ft h eE Ua n dt h eU Sh a da ni n d i r e c te ﬀect at least in the reciprocal tariﬀ reductions
between the two of them.
The coeﬃcient on ∆x provides an estimate for ω − 1. This represents the production weighted
average of the extra importance attached to producer surplus relative to social welfare in the EU
members, as we show in the appendix. We can’t reject that an extra weight is placed on the producer
surplus. The estimates range from 0.0024 in column 6 to 0.0042 in column 3. We provide an alternative
interpretation of this parameter and a comparison with other studies when we model its determinants
in section 4.6.
In Tables 3 and 4, we present the ﬁrst stage regressions for the main speciﬁcations. The regressions
indicate that the instruments used are jointly signiﬁcant in all of our speciﬁcations. Moreover, the
row at the bottom of table 2 labeled as “Hansen’s J” shows that the excluded instruments pass the
orthogonality tests as a group. When the set of instruments is large this test may have low power.
25Therefore, we also test the subset of instruments that are a priori more likely to be endogenous, such
as the export dummy and NTB variables. The results are found in the row “C-Stat” and indicate
that we can’t reject the orthogonality of the smaller subsets either.
4.4 Quantiﬁcation and Interpretation
The simplest interpretation of the coeﬃcient on the PTA variable is that it represents how much the
MFN tariﬀ for PTA products increased relative to the non-PTA products. Its value is 1.6 percentage
points for products exported under any PTA and about 2.2 for every PTA. The reduction for non-PTA
goods was about 3.4 percentage points so the magnitude of the stumbling block eﬀect is not trivial.
We can quantify the tariﬀ eﬀect in terms of price changes to assess its economic importance. In
products where the EU is a price taker in the world market the growth in the advalorem tariﬀ is fully
passed to the price paid by EU consumers. Writing the domestic price as lnpd
t =l n ( 1+tt)+l npw
t
we can immediately see that under full pass-through of tariﬀs the growth in the domestic price of a
PTA good is ∆ln(1 + tPTA), which is approximately equal to ∆tPTA.41 Using this and (23) we can
immediately see that the growth in the domestic price of a PTA good relative to that of a similar
non-PTA good is ∆tPTA− ∆t = φ. Therefore the parameter we estimate can be interpreted as the
relative domestic price growth between similar PTA and non-PTA goods under full pass-through.
In the context of the average price eﬀects generated by tariﬀ changes during the UR, the stumbling
block eﬀect is not negligible. This is clearest from the ratio of the growth eﬀects ∆lnpd
PTA/∆lnpd =
∆ln(1+tPTA)/∆ln(1+t) ≈ ∆tPTA/∆t =1+φ/c, where c is the estimated average tariﬀ change for
non-PTA products. Therefore, the last equality applies to a “benchmark” good with no changes in
market access, nor in the elasticity adjusted production/import ratio. If the stumbling block eﬀect
completely oﬀsets the average price eﬀect, then 1+φ/c =0and if the price eﬀect for the PTA products
were identical to the non-PTA products, the statistic would be equal to 1.
It is also possible to provide an interpretation of the results in terms of price eﬀects for goods where
there is imperfect pass-through from tariﬀs to domestic prices, i.e. when the EU is not a price taker.
This is important because one key concern with PTAs is that they have an impact on other countries
by aﬀecting the prices received by excluded countries.42 Moreover there is considerable evidence of
imperfect pass-through not only from exchange rate changes but also from tariﬀ changes.43 Provided
41This approximation is valid in our sample since ∆ln(1 + tt) − ∆tt for all types of products takes a value between 0
and 0.005 for 90 percent of the sample and between 0 and 0.011 for 99 percent of the sample.
42This concern is conﬁrmed by Chang and Winters (2002) who ﬁnd that the formation of Mercosur lowered the prices
for non-Mercosur producers exporting to them. Olarreaga et al. (1999) show that terms-of-trade eﬀects pose a relatively
important motive in explaining Mercosur’s external tariﬀ structure.
43Kreinin (1961) estimated that less than one third of the U.S. tariﬀ reductions were passed on to its consumers
26that the pass-through is similar for PTA and non-PTA goods then the relative growth in the prices is
also given by the expression above, i.e. ∆lnpw
PTA/∆lnpw ≈ 1+φ/c if πPTA ≈ π < 1. 44 Therefore,
the interpretation of a value for 1+φ/c of say 0.5 is that a non-PTA country received only half of
the export price increase due to the EU MFN tariﬀ changes in the UR by exporting the PTA good
relative to what it would have received by exporting a similar non-PTA good.
At the bottom of table 2 the row labeled 1+φ/c provides the estimates for the stumbling block
price eﬀects as well as their conﬁdence intervals. The eﬀect of any PTA is about 0.53 (column 1) and
it does not change much when we control for whether there is a positive preferential tariﬀ (column 3)
or for the exports of AFS or SGP (column 4). The eﬀect for goods exported by every PTA is stronger,
0.38 (column 2).45
An interesting question is whether our estimates carry any information about the unobserved
counterfactual of what the average EU tariﬀ would have been in the absence of any PTAs. We believe
that they do. First, comparing the estimation equation (20) and (21) we see that the parameter φ
that we estimate is the average diﬀerence in the tariﬀ rates for a given product under a commitment
to MFN, i.e. when no PTAs are allowed, and when they are allowed, as shown in (16). So a strict
interpretation of our estimate in light of the theory is that on average the MFN tariﬀso nPTA products
are 1.6 percentage points higher than they would have been in the absence PTAs. Since PTA products
represent a large share of our sample the average eﬀect for all products is about 1.5 percentage points.
One possible concern with the last argument is that the model does not fully take into account
all the eﬀects that PTAs have on MTL. For example, there has been considerable debate on whether
the PTAs pursued by the US and the EU increased or decreased the probability of completion of the
Uruguay Round. However, there is no consensus on this question. Although the question of stumbling
blocks arose as the Uruguay Round was delayed, with some blaming it on PTAs, several people have
argued that PTAs actually lead partners to the multilateral table. Since multilateral trade rounds are
too infrequent, whether PTAs increase or decrease the probability of a round can not be answered
econometrically. Given that we cannot estimate this eﬀect on the probability, and the lack of consensus
on whether it is even positive or negative, the best we can do is estimate the eﬀects of PTAs on MFN
tariﬀs given that there were PTAs in place in the last round and use the model to interpret these
during the Kennedy multilateral trade round. Feenstra (1989) showed that the eﬀects of the exchange rate pass-through
is symmetric to the eﬀects of tariﬀ changes in the US. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) survey the evidence on imperfect
pass-through from exchange rates.
44To see this deﬁne the pass-through rate from tariﬀsa sπ = ∆lnp
d/∆ln(1+t)=1+∆lnp
w/∆ln(1+t).W ec a nt h e n
write the ratio of world price eﬀects for PTA to non-PTA products as ∆lnp
w
PTA/∆lnp
w =[ ∆ln(1 + t
PTA)/∆ln(1 +
t)](π
PTA− 1)/(π − 1) ≈ 1+φ/c if π
PTA ≈ π < 1.
45The eﬀect of the signiﬁcant individual programs range from 0.88 (GSP) to 0.93 (EFTA, CEC) and the combined
eﬀect of all individual programs is 0.54, smaller than the 0.38 estimated in column (2) but not statistically so.
27estimates in a way that allows us to get at the counterfactual of what would have happened in the
absence of any PTAs.
Although we can’t provide exact econometric estimates of the eﬀects of PTAs on the probability of
the completion of the round we can provide some bounds for our results that try to incorporate such
eﬀe c t s . T od os ow eﬁrst distinguish between a direct and an indirect eﬀe c to fP T A so nM T L .T h e
direct eﬀect of the EU’s PTAs is the one we estimated: the higher tariﬀs the EU maintained on its
PTA goods given how much other countries changed their tariﬀs. The indirect eﬀect refers to whether
the EU’s PTAs increased the probability of the last round and, given that round did occur, whether
those PTAs made other countries reduce their tariﬀsb ym o r eo rl e s s .T h i se ﬀe c ti si n d i r e c ti nt h a t
it works through reciprocity. Thus if PTAs aﬀect the probability of a round they alter the expected
value of the EU’s tariﬀ changes by changing the expected value of reciprocity. Given this consider the
expected diﬀerence in the MFN tariﬀs of the EU in a world with PTAs, denoted by a variable z =1 ,
and the unobserved world without them, z =0 .T h em a i nd i ﬀerence between the two is the existence
of PTA goods and the extent of reciprocity.
E(∆t|z =1 ,I,R,∆x) − E(∆t|z =0 ,I,R,∆x)=φE(I)+ρ(p1R1 − p0R0) (24)
where we assume that in the presence of PTAs if there is a direct stumbling block eﬀect it will aﬀect the
average tariﬀ independently of whether there is a round and that the unilateral motives for changing
the tariﬀs are identical whether there are PTAs or not. When a round is not completed the EU does
not reciprocate other countries’ tariﬀ changes so ρ =0with probability 1 − p1 when there are PTAs
and 1−p0 when there are no PTAs. Therefore, the second term reﬂects the diﬀerence in the expected
reciprocity eﬀect on the EU’s tariﬀsd e p e n d i n go nt h ee x i s t e n c eo fP T A s .T h em o s tn e u t r a lc a s et o
assume is that the existence of PTAs aﬀects neither the probability of a round, p1 = p0,n o rt h e
amount of tariﬀ reductions undertaken by other countries given that a round is completed, R1 = R0.
In this case the reciprocity term in (24) is zero and we obtain the average value of 1.5 percentage
points discussed above.46
To provide some bounds on the results that account for possible eﬀects of PTAs on the probabilities
of MTL suppose that in the absence of PTAs the UR would not have been completed, p0 =0 ,a n d
the mere existence of PTAs assured its completion, p1 =1 . In this case the total stumbling block
eﬀect is 1.5-0.006*(-0.46)=1.2 percentage points, where ρ =0.006 from table 2 and R1 = −0.46 from
46To obtain (24) we use (23) to write E(∆t|z =1 ,I,R,∆x)=p1(φI+β∆x+ρR1+∆m+v)+(1−p1)(φI+β∆x+∆m+v)
and E(∆t|z =0 ,I,R,∆x)=p0(β∆x + ρR1 + ∆m + v)+( 1− p0)(β∆x + ∆m + v).
28table 7. So even under this extreme assumption PTAs are a stumbling block and would have been
so unless the average reduction in tariﬀs by other countries, as represented by R1, had been almost
6 times larger than what we actually observed. If on the other hand p0 =1and the probability of
completing the round under that PTAs was nearly 0 then the total stumbling block eﬀect is at least
1.5 percentage points. Although we did not observe the realization of R0, we can reasonably expect
that it would have entailed some amount of liberalization such that R0 ≤ 0.47
Finally, looking at the importance of the PTA variable from a diﬀerent perspective, we see that the
explained amount of variation in the tariﬀsa c r o s sg o o d sw h i c hc a nb ea t t r i b u t e dt oi ti ss i g n i ﬁcantly
higher than the amount explained by either reciprocity or the political economy variable. Changes in
the political economy variable contributed to an average reduction of 0.8 percentage points whereas
product reciprocity only contributed 0.3 percentage points relative to a situation where neither change.
4.5 Speciﬁcation and Robustness Analysis
We now analyze how sensitive the results in table 2 are to measurement error in the PTA variable, the
exclusion of some variables and the estimation method. We summarize the results in table 5, where the
column labeled “IV-GMM” repeats the basic information from table 2 for ease of comparison. The ﬁrst
row simply gives the coeﬃcient on the PTA variable and the second row provides the quantiﬁcation
discussed in the previous section, both of which refer to speciﬁcation (1) in table 2. The third and
fourth rows provide the test statistics for whether products with a positive preferential tariﬀ or from
countries with a CET generate a stumbling block, which refer to speciﬁcations (3) and (4) in table 2,
respectively.
In deﬁning whether a PTA exported a particular product to the EU we employed a low positive
value as a threshold to minimize classiﬁcation errors. Although we expect this threshold to ameliorate
any measurement error from misclassiﬁcation, it also increases the control group of non-PTA goods
and, if no classiﬁcation error were present, this procedure could introduce it. To test whether the
results are sensitive to this, we repeat our estimation without applying any threshold, e.g. setting
Iany0 equal to 1 if any value of a good from any of the PTA partners entered the EU under a duty-free
rate. The coeﬃcients in table 2 are robust to this in terms of their sign and signiﬁcance without major
47The estimates above provide not only information on the bounds of the EU’s tariﬀs but also on the likelihood
that PTAs had a negative impact on liberalization through reciprocity. To see this more clearly start by assuming no
diﬀerence, p1 = p0,a n dR1 = R0, and then ask whether the total estimated eﬀect contradicts this assumption. Since
even with p1R1 = p0R0 we estimate that the EU’s PTAs caused an increase in its average tariﬀ through the direct eﬀect
it is then plausible that the observed reciprocal tariﬀ reduction of other countries was smaller than it would have been
under no PTAs. This suggests that p1R1 >p 0R0. From this perspective reciprocity eﬀects may have ampliﬁed the
stumbling block eﬀect of PTAs.
29changes in their magnitudes. Therefore, both the main and auxiliary predictions of the model are
veriﬁed and the magnitude of the stumbling block eﬀect is similar, as noted in table 5.
As discussed in section 4.1, the data to construct an exact measure to capture the MFN externality
is not available. Although we don’t think this seriously biases our results, as previously discussed,
we create a proxy for this eﬀect. For each HS-8-digit product, we calculated the share of the top 5
exporters in total exports to the EU in 1994 and 1989—the earliest year when the 8-digit hs data is
reported. If a decrease in this share in a given product reﬂects a longer term decrease over the period
between 1978 and 1994, then we can use it as a proxy. The model hence predicts a negative coeﬃcient
on this variable: products where the share increases have bigger decreases in tariﬀs.48 When we include
our proxy for the (inverse of) MFN externality we ﬁnd that it has the expected negative sign but it is
insigniﬁcant. This could either be because the eﬀect is partially captured by the reciprocity variable,
because the proxy is an imperfect one or MFN externalities were not signiﬁcant. More importantly,
for our purposes both the main and auxiliary predictions of the model are again conﬁrmed and the
growth eﬀect is also statistically identical to the one in the baseline speciﬁcation.
The theoretical model that guides our empirical estimation is parsimonious and therefore it is
possible that we have not accounted for some determinants of the EU’s tariﬀ changes. We do not
expect that such omitted variables will bias our estimates because, as we argue above, even if they
are correlated with the included regressors we instrument, test, and conﬁrm the orthogonality of the
excluded instruments relative to the error term. Nevertheless, there is one variable that does not
appear in the theoretical model that we want to address explicitly: the initial tariﬀ rate. The average
MFN tariﬀ for PTA products in our sample is 7.57%, whereas it is 12.8% for the non-PTA products.
Although in the UR no explicit formula was followed such that higher tariﬀs would be cut by more
than the lower ones, it is certainly a possible outcome and may lead us to ﬁnd bigger cuts in the non-
PTA products. When we add the initial tariﬀ level, we ﬁnd that its coeﬃcient is typically negative, so
products with higher initial tariﬀs had slightly bigger cuts, but it is not always statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, the initial tariﬀ does not aﬀect the sign, magnitude or signiﬁcance of the basic stumbling
block eﬀe c t .A ss h o w ni nt a b l e5t h er e l a t i v eg r o w t he ﬀect evaluated at the average initial tariﬀ is at
least as large as the ones found in table 2. Therefore, the basic results in table 2 are not driven by
diﬀerences in initial tariﬀs across products. Since the main results are not sensitive to the inclusion
48At an extreme the EU is likely to oﬀer larger reductions when it goes from importing a good from 10 diﬀerent
countries to just 1 because when the negotiation is done with one country, and it is the single exporter of the good, then
there is no free-rider problem. That is there are no other exporters waiting to receive an MFN tariﬀ reduction negotiated
by some other country. The single exporter internalizes all the gains of the MFN reduction and will thus oﬀer bigger
tariﬀ reductions to goods exported to the EU.
30of the initial tariﬀ and according to the Schwarz criterion the speciﬁcation without it is preferred, we
choose to focus on the latter, which follows our theoretical model more closely as well.49
The food products industry, SIC 311, contains approximately half of all the products in our sample
that do not enter the EU duty-free through preferential agreements. Although this category does not
include primary agricultural products (it includes processing of food related products) it does share
one important characteristic with agriculture: high protection. To the extent that this feature is time-
invariant, then it is immediately addressed by the fact that we estimate the equations in diﬀerences. If
on the other hand the amount of the reduction depends on the initial tariﬀ, which is on average higher
for 311 than other industries, this could potentially aﬀect the results because half of the products in
311 are non-PTA products and they represent a large share of all non-PTA products in the sample.
However, this last concern should be addressed by including the initial tariﬀ as a regressor, which, as
we have just described, does not aﬀect the results signiﬁcantly.
To study whether the stumbling block eﬀect is merely driven by a cross-industry diﬀerence in the
average tariﬀ cut, we re-estimate the model by dropping the observations in 311 and obtain estimates
that are qualitatively similar to those in table 2 in terms of the signs and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients.
The point estimates of the relative growth eﬀect in the basic speciﬁcation are higher when we exclude
products in 311 but the 95% conﬁdence intervals overlap with those of the corresponding speciﬁcation
in table 2.50
A ﬁnal concern that we address is the potential measurement error in the production data for
petroleum reﬁneries (sic 353) and miscellaneous petroleum and coal products (sic 354). Given that
these are sensitive sectors, the production data for them can be inaccurate and is in some cases missing.
To calculate the EU weighted average production variable used in the main speciﬁcations, we imputed
the missing data for a few countries in 1992 by using information from previous years.51 However,
since these sectors produce outlier values for the political economy variable, ∆x, we re-ran the basic
speciﬁcations by dropping the two industries. They account for less than 0.8% of all products in the
sample and so dropping them does not aﬀect the results.
As we argue in section 4.1, there are good reasons to expect the main regressors to be subject
49We treat the initial tariﬀ as an endogenous regressor.
50Again, a simple explanation for why the basic estimates are not too sensitive is that, to the extent that the change
in tariﬀs for that industry was not already accounted for by the political economy or reciprocity variables, it indicated
the existence of an omitted variable but since we instrument for the preference variable, this omitted variable should not
bias the estimates.
51For these industries we do not have data in 1992 (or surrounding years) for France (354), Germany and Italy (353,
354). We impute it based on the 1978 values by assuming a similar share in total output. For example if the value of














31to endogeneity, either through reverse causation or correlation with omitted variables. Thus, we
report the IV results and, to test if endogeneity is present, we calculate the Hausman statistic. The
probability values to reject the null of consistency of the OLS estimates range from 0.04 to 0.79 across
diﬀerent speciﬁcations.52 Given that overall the tests were inconclusive and we wanted to maintain
comparability across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we have focused on the IV estimates, which may be
ineﬃcient but consistent over all regressions. However, we also calculated the OLS counterpart to
each speciﬁcation and found that the results were qualitatively similar to the IV estimates. Table
5 provides the summary statistics from the OLS estimation that conﬁrm the main prediction of the
model as well as one of the two auxiliary predictions.53
4.6 Political Economy Determinants
There is little systematic evidence on the political economy determinants of the EU’s trade policy. In
this section we provide an empirical model of the political economy weights that allows us to identify
some of their important determinants in the EU. In doing so we can also analyze the validity of our
assumptions that these weights were constant over the last two trade rounds and over industries.
Our theoretical model features a general objective function that allows diﬀerent weights to be
placed on the value of the endowment for diﬀerent products. The interpretation for this becomes
clearer if instead of an endowment economy we think of these goods as being produced by a single
factor with which each individual is endowed. Then our formulation simply corresponds to allowing an
additional weight ωi−1 on producer surplus relative to consumer surplus. An objective function of this
form can be obtained from a model where lobbying is given micro-foundations, such as in Grossman and
Helpman (1994), provided that the ownership of the speciﬁc factors is concentrated.54 In Grossman-
Helpman each industry has the same relative weight in the government’s objective function provided
that it is organized into a lobby. In our sample it is reasonable to assume that all industries are
organized because the available industry data we use to identify this weight is aggregated. Moreover,
in the Grossman-Helpman setting, the extra weight ω−1 has a structural interpretation: the marginal
rate of substitution between social welfare and contributions in the politician’s objective. Therefore,
the estimates of the coeﬃcient on the variable ∆x, which represents the extra weight ω − 1,a r e
52More speciﬁcally, we calculate the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic. They are reported in Table 2 in the row labeled
“Endogeneity p-val”. The value of 0.04 applies to the equivalent of speciﬁcation (4) from table 2 when the initial tariﬀs
are added as a regressor.
53More speciﬁcally we estimate Cragg’s “heteroskedastic OLS”, which is more eﬃcient than OLS in the presence
of heteroskedasticity of unknown form because it uses the orthogonality conditions of the excluded instruments. The
excluded instruments are the same we use for the IV estimates.
54Please see Staiger (1995).
32comparable to structural estimates of the Grossman-Helpman model. To our knowledge there are no
such estimates for the EU but for the US Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimate this extra weight to
be approximately 0.014 whereas Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) estimate a much lower value of
0.0003. Our estimates in table 2 range from 0.0025 to 0.0042 for the speciﬁcations in columns 3 and
6 respectively and are therefore in between the extremes estimated for the US.55
The underlying reason why all organized industries have identical weight in the Grossman-Helpman
model is that they lobby by providing the same good to politicians in exchange for protection, that
is political contributions in the form of cash that may ultimately be used for campaigning. This
formulation is likely to apply better to the US than the EU because several EU members have some
combination of stricter limits on campaign spending, public ﬁnancing and mandatory quotas for free
advertising on television.56 Therefore, we now relax the constraint of identical weights.
As we point out in our discussion of the formation of trade policy in the EU, section 2, lobbies still
work to a large extent through the member governments. Therefore we model the political economy
weights using a ﬁrst order approximation for each member government, c.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally the extra
weight the government in country c places on industry i is a function of various variables indexed by
k,s u c ha st h ee m p l o y m e n ts h a r eo fa ni n d u s t r yi nc, (ωc
i − 1) =
 
k γkπc
ki. Using the result in the
appendix section A.1, the appropriate way to aggregate each industry’s weights, over the diﬀerent EU
















i is country c’s share of EU production in sector i and the structural parameters, γk,a r e
assumed to be identical over EU members. We can substitute out the extra weight in (20), using the
expression above, and then proceed to obtain an estimating equation by taking diﬀerences, as before.





i,w h i c hc a nv a r y
over time, but assuming that the structural parameters, in (25) are time-invariant we can identify γk
by estimating the following augmented version of our initial model:
∆t = φI +
 
k
γk∆(πkx)+ρR + ∆m + e (26)
We construct the weighted variables πk,i n t e r a c tt h e mw i t hx and take diﬀerences to identify γk.
55Goldberg and Maggi actually report 1/ω =0 .986 (p.1145) whereas Gawande and Bandyopadhyay report 1/(ω − 1)
(p.147).
56See for example Nassmacher (2003).
33W ef o c u so nt h es h a r eo fe m p l o y m e n to fa ni n d u s t r yi nc, on the inverse of the wage in the industry
and the industry’s regional concentration. Naturally this is not an exhaustive list of all possible
determinants of these weights but given the limited amount of cross-industry variation and of data
that spans the period from 1978 to 1992 for each EU member, we must be parsimonious. There are
several plausible explanations for expecting a positive eﬀect of each of these measures on the extra
weight that a government places on a sector. First, an industry with a higher share of employment
commands more votes and may thus be more likely to be protected (Caves [1976]). Constantopoulos
(1974) shows that in 1960s the national tariﬀs of several current EU members were indeed aﬀected by
labor concerns and seemed to favor labor intensive sectors. Second, an industry with production that
is concentrated in a speciﬁc region is more likely to be organized as proximity of diﬀerent production
units may lower the costs of creating and maintaining a lobby and thus help overcome any free-rider
problems in obtaining protection (Olson [1965]).57 Finally, Magee et al (1989) argue that industries
with low wages may be given higher weight since its workers have a lower opportunity cost of lobbying
and therefore lobby more intensively.
The estimation results for (26) are presented in table 6. Since the new variables are interacted with
an endogenous variable, x, we also instrument them.58 The estimates in table 6 show that industries
with higher share of employment and higher regional concentration receive higher tariﬀ protection
with “beta” eﬀects of 0.23 and 0.34 respectively.59 Note that industries that are more regionally
concentrated are also more likely to form to lobby the EU Commission directly, which may account
for its strong eﬀect on trade policy. Industries with lower wages get a slightly higher weight but this
eﬀect is never signiﬁcant. This last ﬁnding does not necessarily contradict the evidence that import
protection favors sectors with a large share of low-skill, low-wage workers in developed countries but
it does suggest that the increased protection in those industries is not because they are given a higher
political economy weight.60
57Treﬂer (1993) provides evidence that industries with above average regional concentration tend to receive more
protection in the US. His approach is not a structural one and he does not model the eﬀect of regional concentration on
the weights but rather its ﬁnal eﬀect on trade barriers.
58We use the interaction of each of the instruments used for x with each of the new variables and verify that these
new instruments are exogenous and valid, hence orthogonal to the error term.
59Calculated as the product of the estimated coeﬃcent for the independent variable and the ratio of the standard
deviations of the independent and dependent variables.
60Further evidence that the eﬀect of low wages on protection in developed countries is not, as suggested by Magee et al
(1989), due to lower opportunity cost of lobbying is that in the US unskilled workers demand less, not more, protection
than skilled workers (Goldberg and Maggi 1999, p.1152). An alternative explanation for the evidence of higher protection
for low-skill and wage industries found by Ray (1981) and Lee and Swagel (1997) is that the government objective exhibits
some degree of concern for redistribution as modeled in Limão and Panagariya (2003) for example. The redistribution
channel suggests that the eﬀect of low wages on protection should enter directly into the estimation equation and not as
a determinant of the political economy weights. The model we use to derive the structural equation in the current paper
ignores redistribution concerns. For this reason, and because the focus of this section is to study the determinants of
34Our approach provides a novel way to estimate varying weights that can provide interesting infor-
mation about the ranking of industries in governments’ preferences in terms of structural parameters
rather than policy outcomes. The coeﬃcients on the share of employment, regional concentration
and wage identify the structural parameters, γk, and hence allow us to calculate the EU-wide average
weights for each of the diﬀerent industries and at diﬀerent points in time by using (25). Figure 1
provides the estimates of these weights for 1992 and 1978. Although there is a positive correlation
between the weights we estimate and the average level of protection the simple partial correlation for
1992 is fairly low, which further underscores that the ranking based on the underlying parameters can
provide additional interesting information. Note for example that the industries with the second and
third lowest weights (pottery and textiles) actually are ranked twenty ﬁrst and twenty second out of
28 in terms of highest average tariﬀs and those with the highest weights (machinery except electrical
and petroleum reﬁneries) are ranked fairly low in terms of average tariﬀs. In fact the rank correlation
for 1992 between average industry tariﬀs and the estimated weights is only 0.03. Naturally, there are
non-tariﬀ barriers that could potentially reﬂect some of these weights more closely but it is not clear
whether taking those into account would change the main point here; that there is a way to estimate
the underlying political economy weights and that these can provide a diﬀerent ranking of industries in
the government’s objective relative to the one based solely on the outcome of the protection policy.61
The estimated weights also provide a robustness test of our previous results and in particular of
the assumption of a constant weight over time and industries. In 1992 the extra weights placed on
producer surplus of the sectors in the EU are all estimated to be statistically positive and range from
0.0021 (non-metallic mineral products) to 0.0084 (petroleum reﬁneries). The mean is 0.0044, which is
slightly above the estimate in column 1 of table 2, but the conﬁdence intervals for the weight in each
of the industries overlaps with the earlier estimate. The median is 0.0038—nearly identical to the value
of 0.0037, estimated in table 2, column 1. So restricting the weight to be identical across industries
should not aﬀect our results signiﬁcantly.
The range of weight estimates for 1978 is similar to 1992, as are the mean (0.0047) and median
(0.0041). In fact we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change in the weight for any given industry between 1978 and
1992; there is considerable overlap in their conﬁdence intervals even though they are quite tightly
the political economy weights, we do not augment the basic estimation equation to include the eﬀects of redistribution
or other potential determinants on protection unless they work through the weight.
61The low partial correlations between the weights and tariﬀs for 1992 is perfectly compatible with the signiﬁcant
estimates for the structural parameters, γk, in table 6. First, these parameters were estimated while controlling for other
variables and involved interacting the employment, concentration and wage variables with the x variable, as suggested
by the model, whereas the calculated weights do not rely on that interaction, as is clear from (25). Second, the equation
i se s t i m a t e di nd i ﬀerences and the correlation between the weights and the average tariﬀsi n1 9 7 8i sh i g h e rt h a ni n1 9 9 2 .
35estimated. Therefore, restricting the weight to be identical over time should also not aﬀect the results
substantially. Another implication of the small changes over time in the weights is that they did not
contribute signiﬁcantly to the EU’s tariﬀ reduction in the UR.62
To conclude, the assumption of constant weights is reasonable in this sample and does not appear to
aﬀect our main results signiﬁcantly. This is further supported by noting that the sign and signiﬁcance
of the main parameters in table 6 are identical to those we found in table 2. The main predictions of
t h em o d e la r es t i l lc o n ﬁrmed and the only diﬀerence is a small change in the magnitude of the point
estimate of the growth eﬀect, but even that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from table 2.63 Nonetheless we
did ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant determinants that generate diﬀerent political economy weights across
industries. This suggests that in general the variation in these weights should be modeled empirically
and theoretically.64
5C o n c l u s i o n
We analyze the eﬀects of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization—a contro-
versial issue where the evidence has been scarce. The model we develop captures key features of the
current trading system and provides a rich set of predictions regarding the impact of PTAs on MTL.
We derive and estimate the structural equations of protection using detailed tariﬀ data for the EU dur-
ing the last two multilateral rounds and ﬁnd evidence that its PTAs slowed down MTL. As the model
predicts, this occurred only in products with a zero preferential tariﬀ and was not present in agree-
ments with a common external tariﬀ and transfers. Our model also incorporates domestic political
economy motives for setting trade policy and we ﬁnd a negative relation between import penetration
and tariﬀ levels working through the extra weight that governments place on producer surplus. We
estimate that these industry weights are increasing in regional concentration and employment shares.
We also ﬁnd evidence of reciprocity in the EU’s MTL.
In the absence of its PTAs the EU would have lowered its MFN tariﬀ on PTA products by an
additional 1.6 percentage points. Since the average reduction for non-PTA products was almost twice
62Even though the individual industry weights we estimate do not diﬀer from the mean, we do ﬁnd some diﬀerences
in the weights across industries at the extremes. In particular, bilateral comparisons of each of 353, 354 (petroleum and
coal) and 314 (tobacco) with the remaining industries reveal that the lower bound of the 95% conﬁdence intervals of
these 3 industries exceed the upper bound of the rest a total of 12 times in 1992 and 51 in 1978.
63To compare the speciﬁcations across tables 2 and 6 we also calculated a diﬀerent version that includes an intercept in
the weight equation and thus nests our initial speciﬁcation. In those speciﬁcations (not shown) the estimated intercept
of the weight equation was zero indicating, as we expected, that the extra weight placed on an industry is zero if its
share of employment is zero and it has average concentration.
64Such improvements in modeling could potentially help to explain the puzzlingly low political economy weights thus
far found, when estimating structural political economy models of trade protection.
36as high, the average price eﬀect due to the EU’s multilateral tariﬀ changes was 50-60% for PTA goods
relative to other goods. We also discussed how this wedge between PTA and non-PTA products
provides an estimate of the eﬀect of PTAs on the expected average reductions in all products relative
to a situation where the EU has no PTAs and showed that the eﬀect was at least 1.2 percentage
points.
The evidence for the US and the EU suggest that we should be concerned about a “clash of
liberalizations”. Similar work is required for other countries. However, even if the EU and the US
turn out to be the exception, this concern would still have to be addressed because their share of
world trade implies their PTAs have a potentially large impact on non-members. The inevitable
ﬁnal question is what, if anything, can be done to minimize this clash. The current enthusiasm
for PTAs means that prohibiting them is not feasible and we have not shown that doing so would
necessarily be optimal either. But, there may be ways to grant preferential treatment that do not slow
down MTL. Recall that, according to the model, the eﬀect of PTAs on MTL only occurs when the
preferential tariﬀ is zero and cannot be lowered further. From this perspective the answer is simple:
remove the non-negativity constraint on preferential tariﬀs and allow import subsidies. Limão and
Olarreaga (2004) argue that this generates a Pareto improvement for the three groups of countries:
non-members, preference granting and receiving countries. This or other proposals that target the
source of the problem and take into account the eﬀects on these three groups of countries are the most
likely to be accepted by them and minimize any further “clash of liberalizations”.65
65Limão and Olarreaga (2004) also calculate that a switch by the EU, US and Japan from their preferences to less
developed countries to an import subsidy scheme would generate positive welfare eﬀects for those 3 groups of countries
in the current trade round.
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39A Appendix
A.1 Intra-EU Bargaining Interpretation of the Objective Function
Note that the objective functions GL and ˜ GL in (6) and (8) respectively refer to one “large” country.
However, EU policy reﬂects the interests of several countries that bargain, usually directly through
the Council of Ministers, and then direct the executive arm, the Commission, as we discuss in section
2. We now provide a set of suﬃcient conditions that allow us to interpret the aggregate objective
function we use as the outcome of such bargaining between its members.
Assume that: (1) Union members have the same preferences; (2) there are no trading costs within
the union so the same prices hold for all members; (3) members may have diﬀerent populations and
endowments provided that the set of import sectors (broadly deﬁned) is identical, which implies they
choose to have import taxes on similar industries; (4) the European Council chooses EU trade policies
and eL to maximize their total surplus, given by Weu = ΣcGLc(.). It then bargains over any bilateral
transfers, fc, to implement such a bargain; (5) cash/numeraire transfers are possible across members
and subject to bargaining where on net Σcfc =0 ;( 6 )t h er e g i o n a lg o o dﬁnanced by the EU is valued
by each individual in its totality, i.e. ¯ Ψ(ELc,ES) ≡ Ψ(ΣcELc)+αΨ(ES). Members can still supply
national public goods but these will not aﬀect the analysis, since by deﬁnition they have no regional
spillover.

































where TRis the total import tariﬀ revenue for the EU. Using our assumptions we then have
































This expression is identical to (6) and according to (27), the weight in (6) can be interpreted as an






i stands for the production
share of member c in EU. To see this note that given assumptions (1), (2) and the quasilinearity of
preferences, individuals in all member countries have identical consumer surplus and utility from the
public good. Thus, the ﬁrst set of terms are unchanged in the EU-wide interpretation. Due to as-
sumption (2), pLc
i = pL













so in (6) and in the empirical work we correctly interpret Xi as the EU’s aggregate production in i.
Finally, aggregate transfers balance according to assumption 5, hence Σcfc =0 .
40A.2 Trade Eﬀects
When we relax the perfectly inelastic demand assumption for Small, its export supply increases from
Xi/ki − Di(pL
i (τCm
i ) − τCm
i ) under MFN commitment to Xi/ki under the PTA case without CET.
On the other hand, the exports of Large* to Small increase from zero to Di(pL
i (τEXm
i ) − τEXm
i ) and
























which indicates that the price clearing this market can still be written only as a function of the MFN
tariﬀ and it will not depend on the preferential tariﬀ, τL
i . Thus after solving for each of the tariﬀ











i ) − 1)(Hd∗ 






i ) − τEXm
i ) − DS
i (pL
i (τCm
i ) − τCm
i )
Hd∗ 
i + DS 
i
(29)




i ).T h i si ss a t i s ﬁed because p L = M∗ /(M∗ +M ) and
these are ﬁxed parameters given that we assume ﬁxed endowments and quadratic utility functions that
give rise to demand functions that are linear in prices. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of
( 2 9 )i sg r e a t e rt h a nz e r oi fa n do n l yi fτL
i =0at τCm
i as shown for the case with no trade eﬀects (section
3.4.2). The second term in (29) is less than zero if and only if τEXm
i > τCm
i ;i tr e p r e s e n t sat r a d ee ﬀect
where the numerator measures the change in the volume of Large’s imports under MFN commitment









i ) under the PTA. This decrease
in Large’s total imports implies a decline in the MFN tariﬀ as an extra channel.
The extra trade term attenuates the stumbling block eﬀect but is not enough to fully oﬀset it. In order
to see this, suppose τEXm
i = τCm
i so that the left-hand-side (LHS) of (29) and the second term on the
RHS are zero. In this case the equality holds if and only if τL
i > 0 at τCm
i . However, the equality fails
if the equilibrium preferential tariﬀ at τCm




i − Xi/ki]τCm > 0.G i v e n




i ) − τEXm
i ) in τEXm
i , we can then increase τEXm
i until the
equality holds because when τEXm







i ) falls and a higher equilibrium eS at the higher preference
margin implies a lower marginal beneﬁt, ˜ GL




i , the LHS becomes negative, whereas the RHS would remain positive and increasing.
Therefore, with τEXm
i < τCm
i the equality cannot be re-established, which shows that τEXm
i ≥ τCm
i .
Furthermore, the inequality holds strictly, if the preferential tariﬀ is zero at τCm
i .
41A.3 Tariﬀ Expressions
A.3.1 No Common External Tariﬀ
Equation (11)
Consider good i = I, which is imported by Large from Large* and its symmetric counterpart i = I+1,
which is exported to Large* in return. Simplifying the expression from the FOC for an interior solution












I − 1)d∗ 
I ]
−p L
I MI − (p L∗




I − 1)d∗ 
I ] − (p L
I − 1)MI − (p L∗
I+1 − 1)MI+1 +( ωI − 1)p L
I XI
where p L ≡
∂pL
∂τm, d∗  ≡ ∂d∗
∂p∗ and we use the market clearing condition (5) for good I. Equating to
zero, solving for τm
I and noting that M∗ 
I = Hd∗ 
I , because the supply is ﬁxed, we obtain
τm
I =
(ωI − 1)p L
I XI − (p L
I − 1)MI − (p L∗
I+1 − 1)MI+1
(p L
I − 1)M∗ 
I
Employing the symmetry, we have p L
I = p L∗




I+1, which along with the market clearing condition gives M∗
I+1 + MS∗
I+1 = −MI+1,s o
MI+1 = −(MI + MS
I ). Finally, to obtain (11) we divide by pL∗
I ,u s ep L = M∗ 
M∗ +M  (from implicit
diﬀerentiation of the market clearing condition and M
 S
I =0 ) and employ the standard elasticity
deﬁnitions ε ≡− M pL∗

































I ) − τm
I ) − XI) − (p L∗
I+1 − 1)(HdI+1 − XI+1)







− XI/kI − Hτm
I (p L
I − 1)d∗ 
I ]
−(p L
I − 1)MI − (p L∗
I+1 − 1)MI+1 +( ωI − 1)p L
I XI
w h e r ew eu s eMS
I ≡ DS
I − XI/kI and the market clearing conditions for goods i = I.E q u a t i n g t o
zero, solving for τm
I and noting that M∗ 
I = Hd∗ 
I because the supply is ﬁxed, we obtain
τm
I =
(ωI − 1)p L
I XI − (p L
I − 1)MI − (p L∗






I − 1)M∗ 
I
To obtain (15) we apply the symmetry conditions described in the previous derivation, divide by pL∗
I ,
employ the same elasticity deﬁnitions and ∂eB
∂τm = δXI/HkI from (13).
42A.3.2 Common External Tariﬀ and Transfers




























































where the second line uses (17). To establish the last inequality we must show that the FOC for




∂τL = −MS + GL
eS(δMs/H)=
(−1+δGL
eS/H)Ms < 0 when evaluated at τEXCUm = τCm. This means that Large would gain by










∂τL < 0.T h u sτEXCUm = τCm,T =0and τL =0is not a solution. T
must be increased until −1+δGL






Subscripts: i indexes goods such that i =0for the numeraire and i ∈ [1,2I] for the non-numeraire
goods. Superscripts: i indexes individuals in Large that are endowed with good i, whereas j indexes
the countries Large, Small, Large*, and Small*. Variables for Large* and Small* are denoted with a
“*”.
Variables in section 3.1
Uj(.): Individual utility function
u(cL





i): Consumption of the numeraire (non-numeraire) good(s).
¯ Ψ(EL,ES): Subutility function for the public good in Large.
Ej: Expenditure on public good provision in j.
α: Scope of the regional spillover of the public good.
yiL:I n c o m eo fa ni n d i v i d u a lo ft y p ei in Large.
d(pi): Individual demand for i ∈ [1,2I] in Large.
wiL [wS]: Indirect utility of individual i in Large [Small].
Xi: Large’s endowment of i.
Xi/ki: Small’s endowment of i.
υ(pL
i ): Individual consumer surplus for non-numeraire goods in Large.
TRj:T a r i ﬀ revenue in j.
H: Total population in each country.
h
j
e:N u m b e ro fw o r k e r sp r o d u c i n gE in j.
43ej: Per-capita tax used to ﬁnance public good provision, Ej,i nj.
p
j
i: Domestic price of i in j.
Di:T o t a lﬁx e dd e m a n do fi in Small.
pS
i [pSC
i ]: The domestic supply [consumption] price i in Small.
¯ pi: The upper limit for the consumer price of i up to which there exists a positive demand in Small.
Variables in section 3.2
M
j
i :I m p o r td e m a n do fc o u n t r yj in good i.
τL
i : Large’s speciﬁc preferential tariﬀ on Small’ s exports of i
τm
i : Large’s speciﬁcM F Nt a r i ﬀ.
Variables in section 3.3
˜ Gj(.) [Gj(.)]: Objective of government j in a PTA without [with] a CET.
ωi − 1: Additional weight Large places on import sector surplus.
Variables in section 3.4
ICC [ICEX,ICCU]: Incentive compatibility constraint for Large to ensure no deviation from the MFN
tariﬀs under no PTAs [PTAs without a CET, PTAs with a CET].
τCm
i : Large’s equilibrium MFN tariﬀ under no preferential tariﬀ in i.
τEXm




i ]: The advalorem equivalent of the MFN tariﬀ rate adopted by large countries
under no PTAs [PTAs without a CET, PTAs with a CET] for i.
τB: Large’s equilibrium preferential tariﬀ.
εi: Import demand elasticity of Large for good i.
ε∗
i: Foreign export supply elasticity faced by Large for good i.
δ: Small’s discount factor of time.
τT: The threat level of the tariﬀ used by Large if Small stops cooperating.
˜ eB [eB]: Equilibrium eS under PTAs without [with] a CET.
T: Total amount of numeraire transfer from Large to Small.
A.5 Data Sources and Deﬁnitions of Variables
∆t: Change in the bound advalorem MFN tariﬀ rates between the pre- Uruguay Round and post-UR
periods for the HS 8-digit product i. Source: WTO.
Iany0 [Ievy0]: Indicator variable equal to 1, if good i is imported at a duty-free preferential rate by EU
under any [all] of its PTAs in 1994. It excludes PTAs involving a common external tariﬀ. Sources:
Eurostat’s COMEXT (trade ﬂows) and UNCTAD’s TRAINS (preferential tariﬀ rates).
Iany [Ipos]: Indicator equal to 1, if good i is imported by the EU under any of its PTAs at either
a duty-free or positive preferential tariﬀ rate [a positive preferential rate only] in 1994. Sources:
COMEXT, TRAINS.
Iafs [Ispg]: Indicator equal to 1 if i is imported by the EU from the “new” members Austria, Finland,
or Sweden [Spain, Portugal, or Greece] in 1994. Source: COMEXT.
Ihiexp: Indicator equal to 1 if the exports of any of the PTA partners (excluding the ones with CET)
to the EU in i is greater than the 25th percentile of the exporters’ total exports to the EU and it is









jt): Reciprocity variable measuring changes in market access provided by the
major exporters of i to the EU during the UR; where ∆tc
j/tc
jt is the percentage tariﬀ reduction by
country c in good j between 1986 and 1995, wc
j is the 1992 import share of good j in total imports of
c,a n dsc
i is the exports of a principal supplier c to the EU in i as a share of total exports of i from all
of EU’s principal suppliers. Sources: Finger et al. (1999) and authors’ calculations from COMEXT.
∆x: The EU-wide change in the elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration ratio between 1978
(pre-Tokyo Round) and 1992 (pre-UR), that is xit = Xit/Mitεit for a sector i. The 1978 members of EU
44—Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom—
are considered only. Note that in our data Xit is the value of production measured at domestic
prices whereas Mit is the value of imports measured at world prices. The elasticity measure that





i . Sources: Kee et al. (2004), UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics
Database, COMTRADE, and Penn World Tables.
Ipta_name: Indicator equal to 1, if i is imported at a duty-free preferential rate by EU under the
“pta_name” program, which includes GSP, GSPL, ACP, MED, CEC, and EFTX. Sources: COMEXT
and UNCTAD’s TRAINS.
Dany exp [Devy exp]: Indicator equal to 1, if the good i is imported by EU from any [all] of its PTA
partners in 1994 (regardless of whether they receive a preference or not). Source: COMEXT.
Runi: Reciprocity variable computed only for the unilateral liberalization (between 1986 and 1992)
by the major exporters to EU. The computation is otherwise similar to that of R.S o u r c e s :F i n g e re t
al. (1999), COMEXT and authors’ calculations.
Dntb [Dntball]: Indicator equal to 1 if i i ss u b j e c tt oan o n - t a r i ﬀ barrier that applies to at least one
exporter [all exporters] of i to the EU. Source: TRAINS.
∆p9294, (∆p9294)2, (∆p9294)3: The change in the world price of good i between 1992 and 1994 averaged
over all of its exporters. Source: COMEXT.
∆scale: The change in the EU-wide value added/number of ﬁrms between 1978 and 1992. Sources:
UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics Database, and COMTRADE.
(∆p9294)avgx∆scale: Interaction of ∆p9294 and ∆scale.









i is the share of EU member c’s output in total
EU output for sector i, x is deﬁned as above, and πc
ki is the number of workers employed in sector i
divided by the total number of workers employed (in all sectors) in the member country c. Sources:
UNIDO and COMTRADE.
∆x_rc:C o m p u t e da s∆πkx, where πki = Meanc





      measures the
regional concentration of sector i within EU. Sources: UNIDO,COMTRADE, for production and trade
data, and World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM for population data.









i is the share of EU member c’s output in total EU
output for sector i, x is deﬁned as above, and πc
ki i st h ei n v e r s eo ft h ew a g er a t ei ns e c t o ri for the
member country c. Sources: UNIDO and COMTRADE.
∆scale_shemp, ∆scale_rc, ∆scale_wage, (∆p9294)avgx∆scale_shemp, (∆p9294)avgx∆scale_rc,
(∆p9294)avgx∆scale_wage: Instruments for the related variables explained above, where ∆scale re-
places ∆x, and its interactions with average sector price changes. Sources: UNIDO, COMTRADE,
and WB Development Indicators.
PMFN−ext: A proxy for the MFN externality eﬀect for each i which is calculated as the change in the
share of the top 5 exporters in total exports to the EU between 1989 and 1994. Source: Eurostat’s
COMEXT.
A.6 Details on the EU’s PTAs
MED: includes Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. The “Cooperation
Agreements” (which are the relevant ones for the UR period, hence our study) between the EU
and these countries are predominantly unilateral in nature and date back to 1970s. They comprise
preferences on industrial goods only, with strict rules of origin. Since 1998 a total of 15 Mediterranean
countries, including the ones we considered, have been in the process of signing (or have already signed)
“Association Agreements” to form a Euro-Med area where a WTO-compatible FTA (with reciprocal
45liberalization) is to be formed over a transitional period of up to 12 years. These agreements apart
from their economic nature involve non-economic objectives, where the EU seeks cooperation in social
aﬀairs, migration, human rights, and democracy as outlined in the “Barcelona declaration” of 1995.
ACP: stands for African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc states and covers over 70 countries, which were
mostly former colonies of the EU members. The agreements are part of a series of Lomé Convention
(its predecessors Yaoundé 1963 and 1969) arrangements which went into eﬀect for the ﬁrst time in 1976
and provide non-reciprocal trade beneﬁts in 99 percent of the industrial goods and some agricultural
products, where political and colonial ties appear as the major motivation. The agreements also
administer ﬁnancial and political cooperation including aid packages and infrastructure development
in the recipient states. In the most recent agreements, human rights appear as an essential element
of the cooperation.
GSP: Generalized System of Preferences, ﬁrst introduced in 1971, is the widest program that grants
unilateral concessions to developing countries and covers more than 100 countries. The preferential
rates vary widely according to the competitiveness of the recipient countries and the sensitivity of the
products to the EU market.
GSPL: Generalized System of Preferences for Least Developed Countries grants duty-free access on
most products and some agricultural goods to a set of the poorest nations in the world. In 2001,
the EU started the ‘Everything but arms’ initiative granting duty-free access on all products except
weapons to these countries. These additional preferences are not reﬂe c t e di no u rd a t a .
CEC: includes Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Series of FTAs which serve as
a transition to full membership have been signed with the prospective members. These four countries
signed in 1992 (before the UR) so apart from a gradual liberalization they have committed to pass
laws such as in intellectual property rights or competition that will conform with the EU. Thus, these
countries did not lower their trade barriers substantially relative to the EU at the time the agreements
were signed.
EFTX: covers Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein (i.e. the 1993 EFTA members ex-
cluding Austria, Finland, and Sweden.) The preferences considered here refer to the early FTA
arrangements signed in 1973 and 1974, which exclude most agricultural products and cover mainly
the industrial goods. These FTAs are currently superseded by European Economic Area (EEA) agree-
ment with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein and a separate arrangement with Switzerland, which
call for a wider range of preferences. Moreover the EEA covers the free movement of workers, goods,
services and capital with these three countries and similarly the agreement with Switzerland includes
free movements of workers.
AFS and SPG: AFS stands for Austria (1995), Finland (1995), and Sweden (1995) and SPG stands
for Spain (1986), Portugal (1986), and Greece (1981), which became members of EU in the years indi-
cated in parentheses. In February 1993, Austria, Finland, and Sweden had already started accession
negotiations and signed “Acts of Accession” in June 1994. Thus, we do not include them in computing
the reciprocity and the EFTA variables.
The share of imports from each of the PTA groups as part of total EU imports and as part of total
preferential EU imports (which are indicated in brackets) are as follows for our sample (that is for the
year 1994 and excluding the observations with initial zero MFN tariﬀs.) MED: 2.7% (11.3%), ACP:
0.5% (1.9%), GSP: 13% (57%), GSPL: 0.3% (1.2%), CEC: 1.4% (6%), EFTX: 5.2% (22.3%).
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TABLE 1: Tariffs in the EU by Industry 
SIC   Before UR    AfterUR    Change 
Code Sector  Mean St..D. Mean St.D. Mean St.D. Coef. Var.
311  Food products     0.161 0.087 0.114 0.073  0.047  0.026 0.55
313  Beverages      0.108 0.038 0.073 0.021  0.035  0.018 0.51
314  Tobacco      0.422 0.195 0.252 0.118  0.17  0.089 0.52
321  Textiles      0.096 0.03 0.069 0.023  0.026  0.02 0.77
322  Wearing apparel except footwear   0.126 0.026 0.109 0.025  0.017  0.008 0.47
323  Leather products     0.051 0.023 0.034 0.023  0.016  0.009 0.56
324  Footwear except rubber or plastic  0.095 0.048 0.087 0.04  0.008  0.012 1.50
331  Wood products except furniture   0.056 0.022 0.02 0.025 0.036  0.011 0.31
332  Furniture except metal    0.058 0.007 0.012 0.017  0.046  0.013 0.28
341  Paper and products    0.088 0.02 0.044 0.018  0.044  0.017 0.39
342  Printing and publishing    0.093 0.032 0.047 0.024  0.047  0.017 0.36
351  Industrial chemicals     0.08 0.029 0.055 0.015  0.025  0.027 1.08
352  Other chemicals     0.067 0.018 0.031 0.03  0.036  0.029 0.81
353  Petroleum refineries     0.046 0.02 0.03 0.018 0.015  0.008 0.53
354  Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  0.039 0.023 0.026 0.034  0.013  0.011 0.85
355  Rubber products     0.053 0.023 0.034 0.023  0.019  0.01 0.53
356  Plastic products     0.111 0.048 0.084 0.046  0.027  0.017 0.63
361  Pottery china earthenware    0.078 0.027 0.06 0.025 0.019  0.011 0.58
362  Glass and products    0.074 0.029 0.048 0.031  0.026  0.012 0.46
369  Other non-metallic mineral products   0.045 0.021 0.021 0.017  0.024  0.009 0.38
371  Iron and steel    0.057 0.018 0.004 0.012  0.054  0.021 0.39
372  Non-ferrous metals     0.061 0.024 0.041 0.027  0.021  0.014 0.67
381  Fabricated metal products    0.057 0.019 0.031 0.016  0.026  0.013 0.50
382  Machinery except electrical    0.045 0.013 0.02 0.014 0.025  0.012 0.48
383  Machinery electric     0.063 0.025 0.034 0.021  0.029  0.016 0.55
384  Transport equipment     0.077 0.047 0.053 0.05  0.024  0.018 0.75
385  Professional and scientific equipment   0.062 0.014 0.028 0.016  0.034  0.014 0.41
390  Other manufactured products    0.063 0.017 0.029 0.015  0.034  0.017 0.50
 Total  0.09 0.03  0.05 0.02  0.03  0.01 0.44
Advalorem tariff rates are reported. The number of observations in our sample is equal to 6294. Note that products with initial zero tariff 
rate are excluded from the sample as explained in the text.  48
TABLE 2: Stumbling Block Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
I
any0  0.016*** 0.015***   0.015*** 0.011***  
(>0)  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003)  
I
evy0   0.007***       
(>0)
    (0.002)       
I
any    0.014***     
(>0)
     (0.003)     
I
pos    - 0 . 0 2 6      
(I
pos=-I
any)    (0.031)     
I
afs ‡      0.002    
(=0)
       (0.002)    
I
spg ‡      -0.001    
(=0)
       (0.001)    
I
hiexp       0.005***   
(>0)
        (0.002)   
I
gsp †        0.003*** 
(>0)
         ( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
I
gspl †        0.003*** 
(>0)        (0.001) 
I
acp        0.000 
(>0)        (0.001) 
I
eftx †        0.002*** 
(>0)        (0.001) 
I
med        0.002*** 
(>0)        (0.001) 
I
cec †        0.002*** 
(>0)        (0.001) 
∆x  0.004*  0.003** 0.004*  0.003** 0.003** 0.002*** 
(>0)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
R  0.006* 0.005* 0.008**  0.006* 0.006**  0.007*** 
(>0)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant  -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.030***  -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.028*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations  6294 6294 6294  6294 6294 6294 
Schwarz  Criterion  -7.58 -7.60 -7.55  -7.60 -7.61 -7.64 
Hansen's J p-val 
a  0.515 0.573 0.571  0.497 0.574 0.152 
C-stat p-val 
b  0.736 0.546 0.472  0.718 0.561
e 0.107 
Endogeneity p-val 
c  0.389 0.204 0.309  0.296 0.174 0.794 
Heterosked. p-val 
d  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
1+ φ /c 











1+(φ  + φ
all,hi)/c 
h  n/a 0.38 
(.18,.57) 








any  =0  p-val  n/a n/a 0.69  (accept)  n/a n/a n/a 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; clustering at the 3-digit SIC level; 




cec), based on a test failing to reject their equality. 
The expected signs for the coefficients of the variables are indicated in brackets below them.  a. Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions. Probability value for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation. b. Difference-in Sargan (C) statistic. Probability value for H0: The subset of variables/instruments marked with “‡” in 
Table 2, 3, and 4 are exogenous. c. Endogeneity test based on the C statistic for the main regressors. Probability value for H0: No 
endogeneity among regressors. d. Pagan-Hall heteroskedasticity test. Probability value for H0: Disturbance is homoskedastic. e. The 
following extra instruments are tested for this hi-export specification: D
hiexp, D
ntballxD
hiexp for which the first stage regression results are 
similar but not reported. f. The value for the combined effect of I
any0 and I
hiexp.  g. Calculated for a product exported under every program. 
The other values, with confidence intervals in brackets, are GSP and GSPL: 0.88 (.82, .94), ACP: 1.0 (.94, 1.06), MED: 0.92 (.87, .97), 
EFTX and CEC: 0.93 (.88, .98). h. Confidence intervals calculated using the delta method. 49
TABLE 3: First Stage Regressions  
(Any and Every PTA Specifications) 
 Table  2(1)       Table 2(2)      
  I
any0  ∆x R    I
any0 I
evy0  ∆x R 
D
anyexp 
‡  0.951*** -0.970***  0.019***  0.947*** -0.002  -0.868***  0.018*** 
  (0.023) (0.217) (0.007)   (0.023) (0.020) (0.214) (0.007) 
D
evyexp 
‡       0.037***  0.801***  -0.772***  0.012*** 
       (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.063)  (0.002) 
D
ntball 
‡  0.010 -0.899**  -0.010    0.015 -0.014  -0.986***  -0.009 




‡  -0.236***  0.553 0.011   -0.257***  -0.000  0.364 0.010 




‡       0.193***  -0.109***  1.474***  0.012 
       (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.241)  (0.007) 
∆p9294  -0.004 0.059  -0.004**    -0.003 -0.001 0.042  -0.004** 
  (0.006) (0.059) (0.002)   (0.006) (0.005) (0.059) (0.002) 
(∆p9294)
2  -0.011***  0.010 0.001   -0.009***  0.000 -0.011  0.001 
  (0.003) (0.027) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.001) (0.027) (0.001) 
(∆p9294)
3  0.002**  -0.008 -0.000   0.002* 0.000  -0.005 -0.000* 
  (0.001) (0.009) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) 
D
ntb 
‡  0.051*** 1.013*** 0.025***  0.049*** 0.020*** 1.073*** 0.024*** 
  (0.006) (0.060) (0.020)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.060) (0.002) 
∆scale  0.188***  -0.493*** -0.032***   0.190***  0.003  -0.548*** -0.031*** 
  (0.009) (0.082) (0.002)   (0.009) (0.008) (0.082) (0.002) 
(∆p9294)
avgx∆scale 
‡  -0.404*** -0.628  0.107***   -0.319*** -0.020  -1.224  0.123*** 
  (0.085) (0.804) (0.024)   (0.090) (0.074) (0.798) (0.024) 
R
uni   0.040** -0.066  0.754***    0.041** 0.024  -0.050  0.754*** 
  (0.017) (0.163) (0.005)   (0.017) (0.015) (0.161) (0.005) 
Constant  -0.033  -1.170*** -0.275***   -0.036 0.004  -1.120***  -0.276*** 
  (0.024) (0.222) (0.007)   (0.023) (0.020) (0.220) (0.007) 
Observations  6294 6294 6294   6294 6294 6294 6294 
R-squared  0.373 0.074 0.792     0.384 0.767 0.097 0.794 
Adj. R
2  0.372 0.073 0.792     0.383 0.767 0.095 0.793 
F-test p-val 
a  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Clustering at the 3-digit SIC level. ‡: the subset of instruments further tested for exogeneity. The probability value for the 
difference-in Sargan (C) statistics for these instruments are reported on the row labeled C-stat p-val. in Table 2.  
a.  Probability value for the F–test of H0: The instruments are jointly insignificant.   50
TABLE 4: First Stage Regressions 
 (Individual Programs Specification) 











‡ 0.881***  -0.000  0.028** 0.010  -0.141**  0.011*** 
  (0.016) (0.006) (0.012) (0.025) (0.056) (0.002) 
D
acpexp 
‡ 0.029*  0.878***  -0.005  -0.003  -0.285***  0.004** 




‡ 0.088***  -0.003  0.909***  0.012  -0.503***  -0.004*** 
  (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.049) (0.002) 
D
medexp 
‡ 0.019  -0.001  0.037***  0.850***  -0.286***  -0.006*** 
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.054) (0.002) 
D
ntball 
‡ -0.151***  -0.070***  -0.197***  -0.164*** -1.230*** -0.016*** 




‡ -0.405*** 0.028*  0.203***  0.069***  0.311**  0.009* 




‡ 0.166***  -0.138***  -0.031 0.103***  0.923***  -0.001 




‡ 0.019  0.017  -0.281***  0.037**  -0.198*  0.005 




‡  0.173***  0.006 0.050 -0.314***  0.792***  0.005 
  (0.050) (0.020) (0.039) (0.027) (0.176) (0.004) 
∆p9294  0.014  -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003* 
  (0.017) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.058) (0.002) 
(∆p9294)
2  0.008 -0.001  0.002 -0.002  -0.087***  0.001 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.027) (0.001) 
(∆p9294)
3  -0.002  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001* 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) 
D
ntb 
‡  0.168*** 0.035*** 0.164*** 0.086*** 1.096*** 0.025*** 
  (0.017) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.059) (0.002) 
∆scale  0.158*** 0.005  0.325*** 0.042*** -0.374***  -0.028*** 
  (0.023) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.082) (0.003) 
(∆p9294)
avgx∆scale 
‡  -0.254 -0.175**  -0.795***  -0.467***  -2.697***  0.119*** 
  (0.227) (0.087) (0.176) (0.121) (0.795) (0.025) 
R
uni  0.092**  0.001 0.027 0.009 0.217 0.760*** 
  (0.046) (0.018) (0.036) (0.025) (0.161) (0.005) 
Constant  -0.285*** -0.009  -0.166*** -0.044*** -0.766*** -0.260*** 
  (0.031) (0.012) (0.024) (0.016) (0.107) (0.003) 
Observations 6294 6294 6294 6294 6294 6294 
R-squared  0.494 0.825 0.667 0.721 0.128 0.796 
Adj. R
2  0.493 0.824 0.666 0.721 0.125 0.795 
F-test p-val 
a  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  Clustering at the 3-digit 
SIC level. ‡: the subset of instruments further tested for exogeneity. The probability value for the difference-in Sargan (C) 
statistics for these instruments are reported on the row labeled C-stat p-val in Table 2.  






TABLE 5: Robustness and Specification Analysis 







(No 311)  
HOLS 
[1] I
any0   















[1]  1+ φ /c 
a 
















any =0  
      (p-val) 
Can’t reject 
(0.69) 















afs  (s.e)  
















[1]  Schwarz  Criterion    -7.58  -7.58 -7.64 -7.42 -7.69 -7.68 
Observations  6294  6294 6294 6294 5875 6294 
The numbers in square brackets in the first cell of each row refer to the specification numbers from Table 2. 
a. Measures the relative growth of domestic EU prices due to PTAs (vs non-PTA goods) for full pass-through (π=1) and the relative growth of world prices 
due to PTAs for imperfect pass-through (such that π
PTA ≈π<1). Confidence intervals calculated using the delta method. 
b. The coefficient on the MFN-externality proxy (P
MFN-ext) for the three different specifications with the standard errors in brackets are [1]: -0.008 (0.006), 
[3]: -0.007 (0.006), and [4]: -0.008 (0.006) 
c. The coefficient on the initial tariff variable (tt-1) for the three different specifications with the standard errors in brackets are [1]: -0.189 (0.108), [3]: -0.146 
(0.118), and [4]: -0.172 (0.115).  
d. Refers to the relative growth at the mean initial tariff i.e. 1+φ /(c+ φ
ini0.0789) and when we account for the different average initial tariffs,  
i.e.  (c+ φ
ini0.0789+φ ) /(c+ φ
ini0.128) we obtain 0.21 (-.18, .60)  
e. The 95% Confidence Interval for I
pos + I
any  is [-0.0166, -0.005] 
f. The test of the combined effect I
afs+I
spg =0 yields the following p-values for columns from IV-GMM to HOLS respectively: 0.73, 0.19, 0.69, 0.21, 0.66, 
0.62. 52
TABLE 6: Determinants of Political Economy Weights 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
I
any0  0.010***  0.007***   0.009*** 0.006***  
(>0)  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.003) (0.002)  
I
evy0    0.007***       
(>0)
     (0.001)       
I
any     0.006**     
(>0)
      (0.003)     
I
pos     -0.056     
(=0)
      (0.058)     
I
afs ‡       0.001    
(=0)
        (0.002)    
I
spg ‡       -0.001    
(=0)
        (0.001)    
I
hiexp        0.003*   
(>0)
         (0.002)   
I
gsp †         0.003*** 
(>0)
          (0.001) 
I
gspl †         0.003*** 
(>0)         (0.001) 
I
acp         0.004*** 
(>0)         (0.001) 
I
eftx †         - 0 . 0 0 0  
(>0)         (0.001) 
I
med         0 . 0 0 2 * *  
(>0)         (0.001) 
I
cec †         - 0 . 0 0 0  
(>0)         (0.001) 
∆x_shemp  0.024**  0.027***  0.024*  0.025** 0.014** 0.028*** 
(>0)  (0.012)  (0.008) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
∆x_rc  0.079***  0.084*** 0.070***  0.082*** 0.069*** 0.092*** 
(>0)  (0.020)  (0.018) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.017) (0.010) 
∆x_wage  0.003  0.003 0.004  0.002 0.006 0.004 
(>0)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
R  0.006** 0.006* 0.005  0.007**  0.005* 0.007*** 
(>0)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant  -0.033*** -0.031***  -0.029***  -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.027*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations  6294  6294 6294  6294 6294 6294 
Schwarz  Criterion  -7.68  -7.68 -7.62  -7.68 -7.70 -7.67 
Hansen's  J  p-val   0.4228  0.5055 0.3551  0.4358 0.4342 0.5610 
C-stat p-val 
a  0.5901  0.7713 0.5817  0.7560 0.6954 0.4841 
Endogeneity p-val   0.1394  0.1268  0.2127  0.1491  0.2104  b 
Heterosked.  p-val    0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 











1+(φ  + φ
all,hi)/c
   n/a 0.53 
(.42, .64) 







any =0 p-val  n/a  n/a   0.39(accept)    n/a n/a n/a 
The notes for Table 2 also apply here.  a. The subset of the instruments tested for exogeneity include those marked with “‡” 
in Tables 3 and 4 except (∆p9294)




avgx∆scale_wage instead. b. Number of clusters were insufficient to calculate optimal weighting matrix, hence C-stat 
not computed. c. Total effect of individual programs reported. The other values, with confidence intervals in brackets, are 
GSP and GSPL: 0.89 (.82, .96), ACP: 0.86 (.77, .94), MED: 0.94 (.89, .99), EFTX and CEC: 1.0 (.95, 1.07).   53
TABLE 7: Summary Statistics 
Variable Name  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆t  -0.030 0.022 -0.268 0.000 
I
any0  0.939 0.239 0 1 
I
evy0  0.133 0.339 0 1 
I
any  0.954 0.210 0 1 
I
pos  0.015 0.121 0 1 
I
afs  0.902 0.297 0 1 
I
spg  0.875 0.330 0 1 
I
hiexp  0.891 0.311 0 1 
I
gsp  0.646 0.478 0 1 
I
gspl  0.190 0.392 0 1 
I
acp  0.291 0.454 0 1 
I
eftx  0.870 0.337 0 1 
I
med  0.508 0.500 0 1 
I
cec  0.671 0.470 0 1 
∆x  -2.004 1.853 -13.884 5.466 
R  -0.460 0.118 -0.960 0.000 
D
anyexp  0.984 0.126 0 1 
D
evyexp  0.167 0.373 0 1 
D
gsp  0.899 0.302 0 1 
D
gspl  0.224 0.417 0 1 
D
acp  0.333 0.471 0 1 
D
eftx  0.904 0.294 0 1 
D
med  0.594 0.491 0 1 
D
cec  0.852 0.355 0 1 
D
hiexp  0.948 0.221 0 1 
R
uni  -0.267 0.139 -0.922 0 
D
ntb  0.288 0.453 0 1 
D
ntball  0.096 0.295 0 1 
D
ntballxD
anyexp  0.091 0.288 0 1 
D
ntballxD
evyexp  0.010 0.101 0 1 
D
ntballxD
gsp  0.069 0.253 0 1 
∆p9294  0.001 0.461 -3.912 4.874 
∆scale  0.307 0.322 -0.351 1.047 
(∆p9294)
avgx∆scale  0.005 0.032 -0.053 0.126 
∆x_shemp  -0.125 0.209 -0.689 0.291 
∆x_rc  0.017 0.095 -0.490 0.150 
∆x_wage  -0.554 0.295 -2.72 -0.132 
P
MFN-ext  -0.014 0.066 -0.359 0.357 
tt-1  0.079 0.046 0.005 0.65 
The number of observations in our sample (n) is 6294. There are 8688 non-missing values for ∆t (the dependent variable), which 
is reduced to 7784 when we omit the lines with zero initial tariffs. Missing import and market access variables to construct the 
reciprocity variable reduce the sample to 6837, and missing price data to 6721. Production related data accounts for the 
remaining missing values and leaves us with n=6294.  
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Note: Error bars refer to confidence intervals and are displayed only for the mean weight and those sectors outside the CI of mean weight.